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THE DECLINE AND (POSSIBLE) RENEWAL OF
ASPIRATION IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Robert W. Adler*
Abstract: In the approximately four decades since Congress adopted sweeping
amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act—creating what is commonly known
as the Clean Water Act (CWA)—the United States has made significant progress in reducing
many kinds of water pollution. It is clear, however, that the United States has not attained the
most ambitious of the statutory goals and objectives, including the overarching objective to
“restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
1
waters.” Indeed, although discrete water quality improvements continue in some places and
for some forms of pollution, on a national scale progress toward the CWA’s goals has stalled
in the past two decades. This Article explores several possible reasons for that failure. Those
reasons include subversion of the statutory goals at the administrative, judicial, and
legislative levels due to an imbalance in power between groups interested in how the law is
implemented; the degree to which the statutory goals are perceived as unrealistic by those
charged with implementation; and the potential that Congress intended those ambitious goals
to serve as prods for as much progress as possible, but did not actually expect them to be
achieved. The Article then proposes that significantly more progress can be made if we take
advantage of available means of defining the ecological integrity of aquatic ecosystems more
clearly and more precisely, using as examples biological water quality criteria, functional
assessment methods for wetlands restoration and protection, and the use of real-world desired
future condition definitions for watersheds. Better definition of what the somewhat imprecise
statutory goals mean in the real world might help to overcome the apparent belief that those
goals are impossible or infeasible to attain.
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“It’s not enough that we do our best;
sometimes we have to do what’s
required.” 2
—Winston Churchill
INTRODUCTION
The federal Clean Water Act (CWA) 3 is a mammoth of a statute. 4
Over the course of its long history, 5 the CWA has spawned an equally
2. Jennifer Rosenberg, Churchill Quotes: A Collection of Quotes by Winston Churchill,
ABOUT.COM (July 21, 2013), http://www.history1900s.about.com/od/people/a/ChurchillQuotes.htm.
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387. Congress first passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch.
750, Pub. L. No. 80-85, 62 Stat. 1155, in 1948 and amended it several times before passing the
version now known by its short name, “Clean Water Act.” See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.1.A.4.a (2d ed. 1994).
4. The Act, as amended, consumes 180 pages in the U.S. Code. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387. These
provisions appear at pages 797–977 of the published Code.
5. This Article was inspired by the fortieth anniversary of what most CWA observers view as
adoption of the “modern” version of the statute in October 1972. See Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816.
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impressive battery of implementing regulations 6 and guidance
documents, 7 and a huge body of case law interpreting and enforcing the
statute. 8
This massive level of statutory and regulatory detail is explained,
perhaps, by the reality that water pollution control is a very complex
undertaking. Hundreds of thousands of municipal and industrial “point
source[s]” 9 discharge a diverse array of “pollutant[s]” 10 into the
“navigable waters.” 11 An even larger set of human activities known
somewhat inelegantly as “nonpoint sources” 12—indeed virtually every
human use of land—contributes further to the impairment of the rivers,
lakes, and coastal waters that Congress enacted the CWA to protect.
Efforts to control each of those pollution sources involve technical,
economic, political, and other complexities. The intricate, layered set of
principles Congress adopted to distinguish fairly among those sources
while still providing sufficient control to protect human health and
welfare and the quality of aquatic environments reflect those
complications.
At times, however, this degree of complexity obscures the relatively
straightforward—although admittedly ambitious—overarching objective
of the CWA to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 13 Thus, while many scholars
and practitioners (including me, in both capacities) have written a
tremendous body of doctrinal commentary on virtually all aspects of the
CWA’s implementation, and offered many specific proposals for

6. See 40 C.F.R. pts. 104–503 (2012).
7. For links to a lengthy set of CWA guidance documents, see Water: Policy & Guidance, EPA,
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/index.cfm (last visited Aug. 3, 2013).
8. Federal case annotations alone consume more than 750 pages of the U.S. Code Annotated. See
33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251–1387 (West 2013).
9. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (defining a point source as “any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged”). According to EPA, as of 2001
over 400,000 point source dischargers required permits under the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES). EPA, PROTECTING THE NATION’S WATERS THROUGH EFFECTIVE
NPDES PERMITS, A STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2001 AND BEYOND 1 (2001), available at
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/strategicplan.pdf.
10. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (defining a large range of materials as “pollutant[s]” covered by the
CWA regulatory scheme).
11. See id. § 1362(7) (defining “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States” for
purposes of the statute’s geographic reach).
12. Because the Act does not define “nonpoint sources” separately, by negative implication a
nonpoint source is any source of “pollution” other than a point source.
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(1). As detailed below, this principal objective is accompanied by a series of
subsidiary congressional goals and policies. See id. § 1251(a)(1)–(7).

04 - Adler Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

762

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

10/10/2013 10:49 AM

[Vol. 88:759

improvement, 14 my purpose in this essay honoring the fortieth
anniversary of the pivotal 1972 CWA amendments is far more basic, but
hopefully equally important.
Most analysis of CWA implementation suggests that there has been
significant progress in implementing many of the statute’s discrete
technical commands, although other parts of the law have been far less
effective. Despite this progress, however, it is equally apparent that the
principle aspirations of the statute remain unfulfilled. I explore two main
questions in this Article: (1) why do the CWA’s principal aspirations
remain unmet?; and (2) what can be done to restore the spirit of
aspiration that Congress embedded in the statute in 1972?
Part I of this essay will identify the attributes of the CWA that
characterize it as a highly aspirational statute. Part II will demonstrate
briefly that those aspirations have not been met, despite four solid
decades of dedicated effort and commitment by federal, state, and local
governments as well as the private sector, not to mention billions of
dollars in public and private investment in water pollution control. Part
III will posit three theories to explain why the law’s major aspirations
have not been fulfilled, and attempt to explain the Act’s failures by
reference to each of those theories. Part IV will suggest a new
perspective on how to convert the philosophy of aspiration in the CWA
to reality, supported by several brief examples of existing, uncelebrated
programs that illustrate the concept. Part V will conclude that the key to
restoring aspiration to the CWA—and to restoring the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters—may be to
focus on affirmative definitions of the future condition of aquatic
ecosystems instead of simply implementing a series of negative
prohibitions.

14. For just a small sampling of this huge body of scholarship, and with due apologies to virtually
all of the authors who necessarily must be omitted, see Michael C. Blumm & William Warnock,
Roads Not Taken: EPA vs. Clean Water, 33 ENVTL. L. 79 (2003); Jamison E. Colburn, Waters of the
United States: Theory, Practice, and Integrity at the Supreme Court, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 183
(2007); David Drelich, Restoring the Cornerstone of the Clean Water Act, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
267 (2009); Victor B. Flatt, Spare the Rod and Spoil the Law: Why the Clean Water Act Has Never
Grown Up, 55 ALA. L. REV. 595 (2004); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General
Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409 (2007); Robert L. Glicksman &
Mathew R. Batzel, Science, Politics, Law, and the Arc of the Clean Water Act: The Role of
Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution Control Landmark, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99
(2010); Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More Than Five-and-a-Half Decades of Federal
Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
527 (2005); Mark C. Van Putten & Bradley D. Jackson, The Dilution of the Clean Water Act, 19 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 863 (1986).
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THE CLEAN WATER ACT IS AN ASPIRATIONAL STATUTE

What do I mean by “aspirational”? To some extent, all statutes (or
more precisely, those who propose and adopt them) are aspirational in
that they propose to achieve specific goals, for example, to punish or to
deter individual acts of homicide. An aspirational national homicide
statute, however, might set a goal of “a murder-free America by 2050”
rather than simply criminalizing specific actions.
A.

Chemical, Physical, and Biological Integrity

In this sense, the CWA is manifestly an aspirational statute, as
reflected most notably in the opening words of section 101. 15 Rather
than simply prohibiting specific actions that cause water pollution,
Congress established an ambition-affirmative goal: “The objective of
this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 16
The degree of ambition reflected in this aspiration depends on the
meaning of the word “integrity,” which I have discussed in an earlier
work. 17 Briefly, Congress made clear in the legislative history of the
1972 amendments, in which this language was adopted, that “chemical,
physical, and biological integrity” means something approximating
natural aquatic ecosystem structure and function. The 1971 Senate
Report, for example, indicated that integrity “requires that any
changes . . . in a pristine water body be of a temporary nature, such that
by natural processes, within a few hours, days or weeks, the aquatic
ecosystem will return to a state functionally identical to the original.”18
Similarly, the 1972 House Report explained that integrity “refers to a
condition in which the natural structure and function of ecosystems is
maintained.” 19
Congress reinforced the opening objective of the CWA in the
statutory definition of “pollution” as “the man-made or man-induced
alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity
of water.” 20 Notably, that definition of pollution encompasses a far

15. 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
16. Id. § 1251(a).
17. See Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive
Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity, 33 ENVTL. L. 29, 44–46 (2003).
18. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 76 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742.
19. H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 76 (1972).
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19).
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broader range of human activities that might impair aquatic ecosystem
integrity than direct discharges of pollutants. 21 The statutory definition
of pollution logically includes, for example, dams that alter the flow
regime and physical structure of water bodies; water withdrawals that
change a river’s hydrology, habitat, and temperature regime; levees or
other flood control structures that modify stream bank morphology,
adjacent wetlands, floodplain, and other riparian habitat; and every land
use that causes erosion and sedimentation and changes to storm water
discharge rate and timing. To pursue the analogy to a hypothetical
aspirational national homicide statute, Congress might add, in addition
to direct prohibitions on intentional killing, a definition of “unnatural
deaths.” That definition might include every situation in which people
die from preventable causes, and an accompanying aspirational goal that
all such deaths be avoided.
B.

Subsidiary Goals and Policies

To “achieve” the overarching statutory objective of chemical,
physical, and biological integrity, Congress added a series of subsidiary
goals and policies. 22 There is no clear indication in the legislative history
whether Congress intended to distinguish sharply between the
“objective” in the opening sentence of the CWA and the “goals”
established in subsections 101(a)(1) and (2) versus the “policies”
expressed in subsections 101(a)(3)–(7). Typically, courts assume that the
legislature chooses different words intentionally, to indicate different
meanings. 23 The statutory “objective” appears to reflect the underlying
intended end result of the statutory scheme, and the sentence that follows
the objective makes clear that the ensuing goals and objectives are
designed as means to that end: “In order to achieve this objective it is
hereby declared that, consistent with the provisions of this chapter—
. . . .” 24 Moreover, the two “goals” provisions have an associated
temporal deadline, 25 while the “policy” statements do not, 26 implying a
specific intended result for the former and a more general intent as to
methods for the latter.

21. See id. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12) (prohibiting the discharge of any pollutant by any person).
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)–(7).
23. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995) (“We assume that Congress used two
terms because it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”).
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
25. Id. § 1251(a)(1)–(2).
26. Id. § 1251(a)(3)–(7).
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The Zero-Discharge Goal

The first in the series of goals and policies, commonly referred to as
the “zero-discharge goal,” provides: “[i]t is the national goal that the
discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by
1985.” 27 Again returning to the hypothetical homicide statute, the
analogy would be a congressional pronouncement in 1972 that all
intentional acts leading to the death of a human being, whether or not the
actor intended a fatal result, be eliminated by 1985.
The ambitious and aspirational nature of this goal is underscored by
several factors. Congress defined the term “pollutant” broadly, 28 giving
the national discharge elimination goal a very broad sweep. The term
“navigable waters” 29 also reflects a broad sweep, although the Supreme
Court has narrowed the statute’s geographic jurisdiction through a series
of recent decisions. 30 Note, however, that Congress never actually
envisioned that the so-called “zero-discharge” goal would result in the
complete elimination of pollutants reaching the nation’s waters,
notwithstanding its simultaneous creation of the “National pollutant
discharge elimination system” in section 402 of the CWA. 31 The
statutory goal is “that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable
waters be eliminated by 1985.” 32 The italicized phrase, however, is
defined as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source,” 33 meaning that nonpoint source discharges of
pollutants 34—as well as other forms of water pollution 35—were not
included in the zero-discharge aspiration.
In historical context, the zero-discharge goal must be viewed in light
of the fact that, in 1972, a combination of municipal and industrial
dischargers were dumping large amounts of pollutants into the nation’s

27. Id. § 1251(a)(1).
28. Id. § 1362(6).
29. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
30. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
32. Id. § 1251(a)(1) (emphasis added).
33. Id. § 1362(12) (emphasis added).
34. The statutory definition of “discharge,” unadorned by the qualifier “of pollutants,” is broader
than “discharge of pollutants” because it includes, but is not limited to, a “discharge of pollutants.”
Id. § 1362(16); see S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370 (2006).
35. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (defining “pollution” as “the man-made or man-induced
alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water”), with id.
§ 1362(12) (defining the narrower concept of “discharge of pollutants”).
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waters annually, yet Congress demanded that those discharges cease
entirely in a scant thirteen years. 36 Despite significant progress toward
reducing pollutant discharges over the past four decades, however, it is
notable that we remain a long way from achieving the goal several
decades after the deadline for the initial goal passed.37
2.

The Fishable and Swimmable Goal

The second subsidiary goal of the CWA, commonly referred to as the
“fishable and swimmable” goal, provides that “wherever attainable, an
interim goal of water quality which provides for the protection and
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in
and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983.” 38 This goal, which
focuses on the desired condition of the water body rather than the actions
of individual dischargers, is nevertheless similarly aspirational in that it
articulates a long-term goal rather than simply prescribing or proscribing
particular actions or conduct. A reasonable analogy in the hypothetical
national homicide statute would be a goal of “safe communities by
1983,” meaning that people should feel comfortable walking the streets
of their communities with a reasonable expectation that violent crime is
not likely, even if the risk of violence is not zero.
Despite being aspirational in nature, however, the fishable and
swimmable goal seems inherently less ambitious than the zero-discharge
goal. The fishable and swimmable goal is tempered by the phrase
“wherever attainable,” which, although construed narrowly by EPA, 39
allows some room for exception based on circumstances and therefore is
less absolutist than the zero-discharge goal. The meaning of “wherever
attainable . . . by July 1, 1983,” however, is not entirely clear in the
context of the full provision. One possible meaning, which EPA appears
to have adopted by regulation, is that fishable and swimmable waters
should be achieved by 1983 wherever attainable, meaning in those water
bodies in which those goals are possible. 40 An equally plausible reading
of the text is that Congress intended water bodies to be made fishable
and swimmable, wherever attainable by 1983. This latter interpretation
would allow for some flexibility in the date, but not the ultimate fact, of

36. Id. § 1251(a)(1) (adopted in October 1972 and requiring the complete elimination of the
discharge of pollutants nationwide by 1985).
37. See infra Part III.A.
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).
39. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(g) (2012).
40. See id. § 131.2.
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attainment of the fishable and swimmable goal. 41
Some believe that the CWA aspiration that all pollutant discharges
must be eliminated entirely is extreme, but that the notion that waters
should be unpolluted enough to support resident populations of fish and
wildlife and clean enough to swim in is eminently reasonable. 42 Indeed,
at the time Congress was deliberating the 1972 Amendments, the
National Water Commission favored this water quality-based approach,
believing the zero-discharge goal to be unpractical, unnecessary, and
economically unwise. 43 On the other hand, the deadline for achieving the
fishable and swimmable goal turned out to be unrealistic, at least as the
CWA was actually implemented. Congress allowed only a decade to
move from rivers catching on fire to rivers that were “fishable and
swimmable.” 44 Four decades later, a significant percentage of the
nation’s waters have not yet attained that status. 45
3.

No Toxics in Toxic Amounts

The third subsidiary statutory aspiration, this one in the form of a
congressional “policy” statement, 46 is “the national policy that the
discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts be prohibited.” 47 As with
the phrase chemical, physical, and biological integrity,” the degree of
aspiration reflected in this policy depends on definition. What are “toxic
pollutants” and what is a “toxic amount”? The sixteenth century
physician Paracelsus, often identified as the father of toxicology, 48
famously noted: “Solely the dose determines that a thing is not a
poison.” 49 Any substance can be toxic in sufficient amounts, and
although a sixteenth century physician lacked the tools necessary to
41. Although no court appears to have had the opportunity to pass on these competing
interpretations, presumably the result would depend on whether a court found the meaning of the
provision clear under step I of the Chevron test, or ambiguous under Chevron step II. See Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
42. See infra Part III.B.2.
43. See infra notes 218–20 and accompanying text.
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (2006) (establishing July 1, 1983 deadline in the statute adopted in
October 1972).
45. See infra Part III.A.2.
46. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text regarding the distinction between
congressional goals and policies in the CWA.
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3).
48. See Joseph F. Borzelleca, Paracelsus: Herald of Modern Toxicology, 53 TOXICOLOGICAL
SCI. 2, 2 (2000).
49. Id. at 3. I thank my former colleague Diane Cameron for bringing this quote to my attention
many years ago.
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understand the concept of non-threshold toxins, 50 even the most lethal
substance does not necessarily cause harm in sufficiently low doses.
The term “toxic pollutant” is defined in the CWA, 51 and in the 1977
amendments to the CWA Congress later enumerated more specifically
which pollutants were considered toxic for purposes of the Act. 52 What
constitutes a “toxic amount,” however, remains the subject of the
difficult and controversial science and policy of risk assessment.53 Thus,
the degree of aspiration reflected in the “no toxics in toxic amounts”
policy depends on agency scientific and value judgments regarding what
is toxic.
On its face, the “no toxics in toxic amounts” policy in section
101(a)(3) 54 also seems inconsistent with the zero-discharge goal
established in section 101(a)(1). 55 To be attained, the “zero-discharge
goal” requires that all pollutant discharges be eliminated entirely.
Fulfillment of the “no toxics in toxic amounts” policy, by contrast,
requires only prohibition of the discharge of certain pollutants in certain
amounts. How can the two apparently inconsistent provisions, both of
which were in the original Senate bill leading to the 1972 Act, 56 be
reconciled?
One possible explanation is that Congress adopted the zero-discharge
goal as a statutory goal with an associated 1985 deadline, whereas “no
toxics in toxic amounts” is a policy with no associated deadline. The
most logical way to reconcile those otherwise inconsistent concepts is
that Congress intended EPA to implement the no-toxics policy much
more quickly, as an intermediate step to effectuating both the 1983
“fishable and swimmable” goal and the 1985 “zero-discharge” goal. Of
course, none of the three have been implemented fully as of 2013.57
Nevertheless, the view of the policy articulated in section 101(a)(3) as a
means of implementing the first two statutory goals is consistent with
the fact that the four ensuing congressional “policy” statements similarly
50. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(describing non-threshold pollutants).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13).
52. Id. § 1317(a).
53. See, e.g., Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk Assessment, 19
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409 (1995); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk
Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995).
54. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3).
55. Id. § 1251(a)(1).
56. See S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 2 (1972) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776,
3777. The House bill also included the zero-discharge provision. See id.
57. See infra Part III.
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outline means to the statutory ends. 58
C.

Aspiration Versus Operation in the Clean Water Act

Viewed from the above perspective, there is a logical hierarchy to the
objective, goals, and policies Congress included in section 101(a) of the
CWA. The first sentence of the statute contains Congress’s ultimate
objective, to restore and maintain the structure and function of the
nation’s waters and their associated aquatic ecosystems as measured by
“chemical, physical, and biological integrity.” Congress then articulated
a series of “goals” and “policies” “[i]n order to achieve” that objective.
The policies, however, appear to identify specific means to accomplish
the deadline-driven goals of fishable and swimmable waters, wherever
attainable by 1983, and zero-discharge of pollutants—at least from point
sources—by 1985. Even these two time-defined goals appear to be
ranked, with the earlier 1983 goal of fishable and swimmable waters
identified as an “interim goal” en route to the 1985 zero-discharge
goal. 59
A logical objection to this emphasis on the statutory goals and
policies of the CWA is that hortatory congressional statements typically
have no independent legal force and effect, and therefore can be overinterpreted. 60 Although many courts have quoted those aspirations in
interpreting the operative provisions of the CWA, 61 even referring to
them as the “guiding star[s]” of the 1972 legislation, 62 similar aspirations
are included in many federal environmental statutes.63 One court

58. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (establishing a national policy of providing federal financial
assistance for publicly owned treatment works); id. § 1251(a)(5) (establishing a national policy to
develop and implement areawide waste treatment management planning processes to ensure
adequate pollution control); id. § 1251(a)(6) (establishing a national policy to conduct research and
development necessary to develop the technology needed to eliminate pollutant discharges); id.
§ 1251(a)(7) (establishing a national policy of developing and expeditiously implementing programs
to control nonpoint source pollution).
59. Id. § 1251(a)(2).
60. See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (per curiam) (“[I]t frustrates
rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s
primary objective must be the law.” (emphasis in original)).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Borowski, 977 F.2d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1992); Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Am. Paper Inst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328, 333 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
62. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 612 F.2d 1232, 1236 (10th Cir. 1979); Am. Petrol. Inst. v.
EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1028 (10th Cir. 1976).
63. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006) (Endangered Species Act provision articulating a
congressional purpose “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species
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explained why the specific provisions of operative text in the statute
must temper expectations about complete fulfillment of the statutory
aspirations:
Undeniably, Congress’s strong statement of its objective must color
EPA’s and our interpretation of specific provisions of the Act. But, as
any student of the legislative process soon learns, it is one thing for
Congress to announce a grand goal, and quite another for it to mandate
full implementation of that goal. 64
Why, then, should we focus on the extent to which the aspirations
contained in the hortatory opening provisions of the CWA have been
achieved? First, although it is true that statements of legislative goals
and policies do not have legal force and effect absent legislative
indications to the contrary, courts use such statements to interpret other
statutory provisions. 65 That has been true on numerous occasions in
construing the CWA. 66 On the other hand, courts sometimes specifically
reject the operability of lofty legislative pronouncements in
environmental statutes. This is perhaps most famously the case with the
National Environmental Policy Act, 67 but has also been true for the

and threatened species depend may be conserved”); 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006) (National
Environmental Policy Act provision establishing a “national policy which will encourage productive
and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; [and] to promote efforts which will
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare
of man”); id. § 6902(b) (establishing a “national policy of the United States that, wherever feasible,
the generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced or eliminated as expeditiously as feasible,” and
waste that is generated is “treated, stored, or disposed of so as to minimize the present and future
threat to human health and the environment”); id. § 7401(b)(1) (Clean Air Act provision
establishing congressional purpose “to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources
so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population”).
64. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court noted that
Congress intended the statutory objective to be tempered by economic, technological, and political
realities, as reflected in specific exemptions or requirements of various operative provisions. Id. The
court further stated:
Moreover, the purposes section, in its own right, suggests that Congress recognized that the
substantive provisions of the Act fall short of completely achieving the announced goals of the
Act. Congress hedged the purposes section by making it apply only as “consistent with the
provisions of this [Act],” and explicitly distinguished between the congressional “policy” to
eliminate discharge of toxic pollutants and the presumably weaker “goal” of eliminating
discharge of all pollutants.
Id.
65. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 n.7 (1981) (citing statutory preamble to interpret
other provisions of Mine Safety and Health Act).
66. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper, 612 F.2d at 1236; Am. Petrol. Inst., 540 F.2d at 1028.
67. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (minimizing the
significance of Congress’s substantive policy statements in favor of the operative procedural
provisions of the statute).
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CWA. 68
Second, although other federal environmental statutes contain
similarly lofty rhetorical goals, 69 arguably none of them articulate
affirmative aspirations as clearly, as specifically, and as unambiguously
as does the CWA. For example, the purpose of the Endangered Species
Act is to “provide a means” to protect endangered species and the
ecosystems on which they depend, 70 and the policy of the National
Environmental Policy Act is to “encourage” harmony between humans
and the environment and to “promote efforts” to reduce or eliminate
environmental harm. 71 Although the CWA also includes aspirations to
provide a means to achieve various statutory ends, the underlying
objective is not simply to provide those means, but affirmatively to
restore and maintain the “integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 72
Similarly, the stated goals and purposes of the Clean Air Act (CAA)
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), respectively,
are more qualified than are the analogous aspirations in the CWA. The
CAA promises “to protect and enhance” air quality to an unspecified
degree, 73 and the RCRA commits only to “reduce[] or eliminate[]” waste
generation to the extent feasible, and where it is not feasible to do so to
“minimize” resulting threats to human health and the environment. 74 By
contrast, in addition to the overarching promise of complete restoration
and maintenance of chemical, physical, and biological integrity, the
1972 CWA included more specific commitments to provide water
quality sufficient to support fishable and swimmable waters by 1983
wherever attainable, 75 and to eliminate point source discharges of
pollutants by 1985. 76
Third, and most important, Congress included in the CWA specific
operative provisions designed to implement the major aspirations in the
statute’s opening statement, making it more difficult to simply ignore
those aspirations as the product of lofty legislative pronouncements.

68. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1).
74. Id. § 6902(b).
75. 33 U.S.C. §1251(a)(2). But see supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text regarding
alternative interpretations of this language.
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
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Section 303(c) of the CWA 77 most directly links one of the statute’s key
operative provisions to the statement of goals and policies by providing
that state water quality standards “shall be such as to protect the public
health or welfare, enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes of
this [Act].” 78 In its water quality standards program regulations, EPA
interprets this language to require state water quality standards to protect
two minimum types of uses in all water bodies for which attainment of
those uses is possible: (1) fish, shellfish, and wildlife, and (2) recreation
involving human contact with water (“contact recreation”). 79 Moreover,
CWA section 301(b)(1)(C) required effluent limitations for point source
discharges sufficient to meet those standards—and therefore to protect
the minimum statutory uses of fishable and swimmable waters—by July
1, 1977; 80 the total “maximum daily load” (TMDL) provision requires
states to develop and implement corrective measures for those waters
that failed to meet those standards. 81 Thus, Congress matched the
statutory aspiration of fishable and swimmable waters by 1983 with very
specific provisions to effectuate that goal.
Similarly, in the 1972 legislation Congress backed up the 1985 zerodischarge goal with specific statutory-implementing requirements,
although with somewhat more liberal escape provisions to account for
potential infeasibility. Moreover, as discussed further below, in the 1977
and 1981 amendments Congress weakened those provisions in several
significant ways. 82 With respect to both municipal sewage and industrial
point source discharges, Congress in 1972 adopted two sequential series
of technology-based “effluent limitations” designed to move from
pollutant abatement to pollutant elimination, with express requirements
to achieve the zero-discharge goal wherever possible.
For municipal sewage, Congress required publicly-owned treatment
works (POTWs) to adopt “secondary treatment” technology to meet
effluent standards adopted by EPA 83 by July 1, 1977. 84 However,
Congress also imposed on POTWs a second round of stricter
technology-based treatment requirements known as “best practicable

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. § 1313(c).
Id. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
40 C.F.R. § 131.2 (2012).
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C).
Id. § 1313(d)–(e).
See infra notes 130–40 and accompanying text.
EPA adopted secondary treatment standards by regulation. 40 C.F.R. § 133.102.
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B).
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waste treatment technology” (BPWTT). 85 Congress defined BPWTT in
section 201(b) of the 1972 amendments as “including reclaiming and
recycling of water, and confined disposal of pollutants,” 86 and in several
other provisions and relevant legislative history clarified that the
BPWTT standard was adopted to eliminate water disposal of sewage
pollutants through wastewater recycling and reuse and land disposal of
the remaining solids. 87
Congress adopted similarly ambitious zero-discharge requirements for
industrial point sources, also in two phases. By July 1, 1977, the Act
required those dischargers to adopt the “best practicable control
technology currently available” (BPT), 88 but the second round of
industrial effluent limitations required the “best available technology
economically achievable” (BAT) “which will result in reasonable further
progress toward the national goal of eliminating the discharge of all
pollutants,” and which “shall require the elimination of discharges of all
pollutants if . . . such elimination is technologically and economically
achievable for a category or class of point sources.” 89 Similarly, for new
industrial point sources Congress demanded the “greatest degree of
effluent reduction . . . achievable through application of the best
available demonstrated control technology, processes, operating
methods, or other alternatives, including, where practicable, a standard
permitting no discharge of pollutants.” 90 Thus, although qualified by
concepts of feasibility, Congress specifically backed up its zerodischarge aspiration with enforceable discharge control requirements.
Likewise, in the 1972 version of the CWA, Congress sought to
implement the “no toxics in toxic amounts” aspiration with specific
regulatory requirements. In section 307, Congress directed EPA to
publish a list of toxic water pollutants, and to promulgate pollutant-

85. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, sec. 49, § 304, 91 Stat. 1566, 1588 (adding
§ 304(d)(3), codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1314(d)(3)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, sec. 2, §§ 201, 301, 86 Stat. 816, 833–34, 845, repealed by Municipal
Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-117, § 21(b), 95
Stat. 1623, 1632 (repealing § 301(b)(2)(B)).
86. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 §§ 201, 301(b), 86 Stat. at 833–34,
844–45.
87. For a more thorough discussion, see Robert W. Adler, Water and Wastewater Infrastructure
in the United States: The Clean Water-Energy-Climate Nexus, 4 GEO. WASH. J. OF ENERGY &
ENVTL. L. __ (forthcoming Summer 2013).
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A). New source performance standards adopted under this provision
must be included in all discharge permits for new sources. Id. § 1342(a)(1)–(b)(1).
89. Id. § 1311(b)(2)(A).
90. Id. § 1316(a)(1).
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specific effluent standards or prohibitions for those pollutants. 91
Congress amended those requirements in 1977 to control toxic pollutants
from industrial sources largely through the technology-based effluent
limitations adopted under sections 301 and 304 of the Act, 92 but in the
amended version of section 307 Congress retained EPA’s authority to
regulate pollutants, in the alternative, based on toxicity rather than
feasibility. 93
It is significantly more difficult to evaluate the degree to which
Congress adopted operative provisions designed to effectuate the
overarching statutory objective to “restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 94 That
objective requires full implementation of the entire statute in all its
complexity. Clearly, Congress understood in 1972 that control of point
sources alone—even to the point of zero discharge—would not suffice to
attain the statutory objective given the pervasive nature of nonpoint
source pollution. 95 To address this problem, however, Congress enacted
a series of comprehensive planning and control provisions designed, in
theory, to identify and control the full range of pollution sources. 96
What is not so clear is whether Congress understood, at least in 1972,
the breadth of reasons why the waters of the United States had lost their
chemical, physical, and biological integrity, and the equally broad scope
of actions needed to redress them. Although Congress adopted measures
to address both point source and nonpoint source discharges of
pollutants into the nation’s waters, it did not focus so clearly on other
forms of water “pollution,” such as dams, water diversions, stream
channelization, and loss or degradation of floodplains and other riparian
habitats, 97 and the tools needed to address those problems are far less
91. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 307(a), 86 Stat. at 856–
57. Congress directed EPA to adopt those standards based on toxicity, persistence, degradability,
presence in aquatic organisms and the importance of those organisms, and the nature and degree of
impacts from those pollutants. Id.
92. See Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 53(a), 91 Stat. 1566, 1589–90 (amending
33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)).
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2).
94. Id. § 1251(a).
95. See S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 39 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3705.
96. See 33 U.S.C. § 1281 (calling for adoption of comprehensive waste treatment management
plans); id. § 1288 (calling for area-wide waste treatment programs addressing multiple pollution
sources); id. § 1313(d) (requiring total maximum daily load calculations for impaired waters); id.
§ 1313(e) (requiring states to develop continuing planning processes to address aggregate water
pollution problems).
97. See ROBIN A. ABELL ET AL., FRESHWATER ECOREGIONS OF NORTH AMERICA, A
CONSERVATION ASSESSMENT 17–20 (2000) (identifying diverse sources of impairment to U.S.
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precise. Arguably, the one provision that focuses sharply on physical
destruction of aquatic ecosystems, the permitting program that governs
discharges of dredged or fill material into wetlands and other waters of
the United States, has been among the least effective in achieving the
goals and objectives of the statute. 98
Thus, although the operative provisions of the CWA implement the
statutory goals and objectives inconsistently, it is clear that Congress
adopted specific provisions designed to effectuate the goals articulated
in section 101, rather than leaving them as entirely hortatory aspirations.
The next section of this Article evaluates the effectiveness of each of
these statutory provisions, and others, in achieving the aspirations
Congress articulated for the nation’s waters in section 101 of the CWA.
II.

THERE HAS BEEN A NOTABLE DECLINE OF ASPIRATION
IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT

The above description of the aspirations Congress established for the
nation’s waters suggests three questions. First, to what degree have those
aspirations been achieved in the four decades since the 1972 Act was
adopted? Second, to the extent that some or all of those goals have not
been attained, what might explain those failures? Third, is there any
realistic hope of renewing the aspirations Congress adopted in 1972?
A.

Relative Attainment of CWA Aspirations

Particularly given the degree of ambition reflected in CWA section
101(a), it is not surprising that the record of attaining those aspirations is
mixed. LaJuana Wilcher, EPA Assistant Administrator for Water under
President George H.W. Bush, was fond of saying, “We can’t honestly
say that all of our waters are fishable and swimmable, but at least they’re
no longer flammable.” 99 As aspirations go, this was a rather modest one.
I do not, however, interpret Ms. Wilcher as suggesting that we should
rest easy with the knowledge that rivers no longer catch on fire. She
aquatic ecosystems); EPA, A PRIMER ON USING BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS TO SUPPORT WATER
QUALITY MANAGEMENT 1 (2011) [hereinafter PRIMER ON USING BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS]
(same).
98. See infra notes 181–99 and accompanying text.
99. I was a Senior Attorney and Director of the Clean Water Program at the Natural Resources
Defense Council at the time I heard these speeches. I also served on the Management Advisory
Committee to Ms. Wilcher. Ms. Wilcher was referring to the fact that the Cuyahoga River fire of
June 22, 1969 provided some impetus for enactment of the 1972 CWA amendments. See Jonathan
H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of Environmental Protection, 14
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 89, 92 (2002).
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merely was indicating that significant progress had been made in
cleaning up the nation’s waters even if additional problems remained.
There is considerable evidence to support this “glass half full” picture of
the nation’s clean water accomplishments since 1972.
1.

Progress Toward Zero Discharge

There is little doubt that significant progress has been made in
reducing point source pollutant discharges since 1972. In the case of
municipal sewage, as of 2008, the number of U.S. residents served by
advanced wastewater treatment systems increased from less than eight
million to approximately 113 million, and the population served by less
than secondary treatment 100 declined from fifty million to fewer than
four million. 101 That resulted in an estimated 45% reduction in major
pollutants discharged to surface waters in the face of a 35% increase in
sewage inflow into the nation’s sewer systems. 102
Industrial dischargers show similar progress. States or EPA issued
tens of thousands of NPDES permits to industrial facilities under CWA
section 402. 103 EPA estimates that the initial implementation of
treatment requirements imposed under those permits reduced discharges
of toxic pollutants dramatically, plus significantly larger reductions for
100. Secondary treatment refers to the minimum level of treatment Congress deemed acceptable
for municipal sewage. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B). EPA defined secondary treatment more
specifically by regulation. 40 C.F.R. pt. 133 (2012). See generally DADE W. MOELLER,
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 173 (3d ed. 2005).
101. EPA, EPA-832-R-10-002, CLEAN WATERSHED NEEDS SURVEY 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS,
at ix (2010) [hereinafter CLEAN WATERSHED NEEDS SURVEY]. Approximately three quarters of the
U.S. population is now served by centralized wastewater collection and treatment systems. Id.
Moreover, a large percentage of treatment facilities that do not attain secondary treatment are
subject to statutory waivers for certain ocean discharges. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(h); Clean Water Act
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, sec. 44, § 301(h), 91 Stat. 1566, 1584.
102. EPA, EPA-832-R-00-008, PROGRESS IN WATER QUALITY: AN EVALUATION OF THE
NATIONAL INVESTMENT IN MUNICIPAL WASTEWATER TREATMENT, at ES-5 (2000) [hereinafter
PROGRESS IN WATER QUALITY]. EPA’s forty-five percent decline estimate is based on reductions in
the traditional measure of five-day biological oxygen demand (BOD5) used in EPA’s secondary
treatment definition. See 40 C.F.R. § 133.102.
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. According to data reported by EPA on NPDES permit backlogs, as of
March 2013 there were 5082 permits for major industrial facilities out of 6699 facilities total,
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), Backlog Reduction, EPA.GOV,
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/grade_2013.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2013); 32,890 permits for
minor
industrial
facilities
out
of
39,459
total,
id.
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/grade_minor_2013.pdf; and non-storm water general permits
covering 73,483 out of 80,279 facilities, id. http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/grade_all_2013.pdf.
Overall, EPA estimates that more than 500,000 facilities require NPDES permits. EPA, EPA-833-R01-001, PROTECTING THE NATION’S WATERS THROUGH EFFECTIVE NPDES PERMITS, A STRATEGIC
PLAN FY 2001 AND BEYOND 1 fig.1 (2001).
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“conventional pollutants.” 104
Those reductions, however, bring us nowhere close to meeting the
zero-discharge goal of the CWA. The obvious conclusion from a 45%
reduction in sewage discharges is that 55% of those discharges continue
nearly three decades after the statutory goal elapsed. Moreover, future
population growth is likely to overwhelm past gains if we continue our
current funding and other policies. EPA estimates that by 2016, total
discharges of biological oxygen demanding pollutants from sewage 105
will be similar to what they were in the mid-1970s, and by 2025 they
will approximate those that occurred before the 1972 CWA. 106
The same is true for industrial pollutant discharges. A large majority
of the roughly 45,000 industrial NPDES permits allow discharges to
continue, even if treatment requirements have reduced those releases in
volume and toxicity. According to EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory
(TRI), 107 industries continued to discharge nearly a quarter of a billion
pounds of toxic pollutants into U.S. surface waters in 2011, 108 and those
numbers have not changed significantly in nearly a decade. 109
2.

Progress Toward Fishable and Swimmable Waters

Although the strict zero-discharge goal epitomizes the overall
statutory objective of full chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the nation’s waters, most people probably care more about progress
toward the fishable and swimmable goal of the CWA. As is true for
zero-discharge, the record in meeting this goal is mixed. Within two
decades of the Act’s passage, many more waterways were safer for
swimming, many more fish were safer to eat, and many more
populations of fish and aquatic life recovered. 110
We are a long way, however, from fully meeting the fishable and
swimmable aspirations of the CWA. According to EPA’s most recent
National Water Quality Inventory, 53% of the nation’s assessed river
miles, 67% of its assessed estuarine surface area, 66% of its assessed

104. See ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 16 (1993).
105. See MOELLER, supra note 100, at 202–03 (explaining oxygen demanding pollutants and
methods of measuring them).
106. PROGRESS IN WATER QUALITY, supra note 102, at ES-6.
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2006) (establishing a comprehensive reporting system for releases of
identified toxic chemicals to the environment above prescribed reporting levels).
108. EPA, 2011 TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY, NATIONAL ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 4 (2013).
109. See id. at 6 fig.4 (depicting roughly constant releases to surface waters).
110. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 104, at 22–29.
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lake acreage, and 82% of its assessed wetlands acreage remain impaired
in at least one respect. 111 Similarly, a recent EPA assessment of the
biological health of small streams, the first in a series of EPA biological
assessments of different classes of water bodies, 112 found that 42% were
in poor condition, 25% were in fair condition, 5% were not assessed, and
only 28% were in good condition. 113
Much, but not all, of this remaining water quality impairment is due
to nonpoint sources, and so is independent of our failure to meet the
zero-discharge goal of the CWA. According to one recent
comprehensive analysis, large portions of the country remain at
significant impairment risk due to nonpoint sources. 114 Thus, not only
have we failed to meet the ultimate statutory objective of restoring the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of more than half of the
nation’s waters, we have not even met the “interim” 1983 goal of
fishable and swimmable waters.
3.

No Toxics in Toxic Amounts

Arguably the most pressing, but also perhaps the most reasonable, of
the aspirations Congress articulated in the 1972 legislation was “no
toxics in toxic amounts.” Even if point source discharges could not be
eliminated by 1985, at a minimum it may have been more realistic to
expect that those discharges could be treated to the point that they were
no longer toxic. 115 Even that more modest goal, however, clearly has not
111. EPA formerly published biennial reports entitled the “National Water Quality Inventory,
[Year] Report to Congress,” based on state reporting pursuant to CWA § 305(b), codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1315(b) (2006). See, e.g., EPA, EPA 841-R-00-001, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY
INVENTORY:
1998
REPORT
TO
CONGRESS
(2000),
available
at
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/305b/98report_index.cfm. Now, EPA publishes and
analyzes the most recent data online. See EPA, WATERSHED ASSESSMENT, TRACKING, &
ENVIRONMENTAL
RESULTS:
NATIONAL
SUMMARY
OF
STATE
INFORMATION,
http://ofmpub.epa.gov/waters10/attains_nation_cy.control (last visited Sept. 2, 2013) [hereinafter
NATIONAL WATERSHED ASSESSMENT]. The percentages were derived by dividing the threatened
and impaired waters by the total number of assessed waters. The Assessment indicated that not all
waters have been assessed for water quality attainment, so I base this analysis only on assessed
waters.
112. See EPA, EPA-822-R-02-048, SUMMARY OF BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAMS AND
BIOCRITERIA DEVELOPMENT FOR STATES, TRIBES, TERRITORIES, AND INTERSTATE COMMISSIONS:
STREAMS AND WADEABLE RIVERS (2002).
113. See EPA, EPA-841-F-06-001, THE WADEABLE STREAMS ASSESSMENT: A COLLABORATIVE
SURVEY OF THE NATION’S STREAMS (2006).
114. Thomas C. Brown & Pamela Froemke, Nationwide Assessment of Nonpoint Source Threats
to Water Quality, 62 BIOSCIENCE 136, 140–43 (2012); see also NATIONAL WATERSHED
ASSESSMENT, supra note 111.
115. Admittedly the issue of determining what concentrations of pollutants meet the definition of
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been met. For example, U.S. Geological Survey monitoring has detected
at least one pesticide in 97% of surface water samples and over 90% of
fish samples. 116 According to the National Water Quality Inventory,
approximately 10,000 river miles and 500,000 acres of lakes have
advisories against consuming fish by at least some population groups
due to toxicity of that food source. 117 Likewise, states reported 78,339
river miles impaired by polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), 63,837
impaired by mercury, 75,770 by other toxic metals, 16,819 by pesticides,
4321 by dioxin, and 4474 by other toxic organic chemicals. 118
B.

Possible Reasons for Failure of Aspiration

It is extremely important to take stock of the progress made under the
CWA in the past forty years. Arguably one reason for current antiregulatory sentiment is collective societal amnesia. Perhaps many people
simply do not remember (or, in case of younger people, never
experienced) the rivers catching fire, the massive fish kills, or the
beaches filled with raw sewage that inspired Congress to pass the 1972
CWA. 119 Failing to celebrate those successes contributes to collective
societal amnesia, which further fuels anti-regulatory rhetoric and
contributes to the argument that aspirations in the CWA and other
environmental statutes cost a lot of money but accomplish little more
than making us feel self-righteous.
At the same time, it is worth exploring potential reasons why the
original aspirations Congress set forth in 1972 have not been met, and
based on that analysis, whether new strategies can be devised to
overcome the remaining gaps between aspiration and reality. I suggest
three perspectives on why the aspirations set forth in the 1972 CWA
have not been achieved to date. Rather than arguing that any one of these
three explanations is “correct,” I suggest that each explanation is true to
some degree, and in some contexts.
The most “political” explanation is that the original statutory goals
“toxic” is no easy task. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
116. U.S. GEOL. SURVEY, FACT SHEET 2004-3098, STUDIES BY THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
ON SOURCES, TRANSPORT, AND FATE OF AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS (2004).
117. See NATIONAL WATERSHED ASSESSMENT, supra note 111.
118. See id.
119. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 104, at 5–6. As just one telling example, a recent news story
compared the annual swim in Boston’s Charles River to the time when people were advised to get
tetanus shots if they fell in the river. Living on Earth: Love That Dirty Water, Swimming in Boston’s
Charles
River
(radio
broadcast
week
of
June
7,
2013),
available
at
http://www.loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=13-P13-00023&segmentID=3.
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have been subverted at the administrative, judicial, and legislative levels,
in whole or in part because of an imbalance of power between the
interest groups involved in CWA implementation (particularly industry,
state and local governments, and environmental or resource user
groups). In other words, Congress meant what it said, but political forces
have made full implementation difficult. A second, somewhat related
explanation is that the aspirations Congress articulated in 1972 were so
ambitious that those charged with implementing them never believed
them to be achievable, and instead substituted what they viewed as more
“realistic” goals. Congress meant what it said, but the implementing
agencies chose to substitute their own policies in place of the stated
legislative aspirations. The third possibility is that Congress intentionally
established such ambitious aspirations without expecting that they would
actually be achieved, instead hoping that they would prod more
aggressive implementation than would otherwise occur. Congress meant
what it said, but not literally. Each potential explanation is explored
further below.
1.

Subversion Due to Imbalance of Power

The cynical but perhaps realistic view is that the aspirations set forth
in the CWA were subverted over time due to an imbalance in political
and legal power among the parties interested in the statute’s
implementation. This might be explained by agency capture theory or
other factors. 120 The common sense explanation is that the entities who
would bear the costs of implementing the ambitious statutory aspirations
had far more resources and political power to monitor, influence, and
challenge in court the numerous steps necessary to effectuate the CWA
than did the nonprofit organizations such as the Natural Resources
Defense Council and Environmental Defense Fund 121 who carried the
banner on those issues on behalf of the public. 122 Entities that had
incentives to advocate for reduced compliance costs included most
notably industrial point sources (a “who’s who” of major U.S.

120. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal
Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 315–21 (1991) (describing the effect of
agency capture on EPA); Joel A. Mintz, Has Industry Captured the EPA?: Appraising Marver
Bernstein’s Captive Agency Theory After Fifty Years, 17 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2005).
121. I say this with all due respect to the effectiveness of those organizations, particularly given
that I headed NRDC’s Clean Water Program for seven years.
122. Case captions bearing the names of these organizations as lead plaintiffs are legion. See, e.g.,
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 656 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v.
Costle, 636 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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manufacturing and resource extraction industries 123) and the country’s
large and small municipalities.
There are many examples of this power imbalance in the history of
CWA implementation at the legislative, administrative, and judicial
levels of action. Although the large body of academic literature
evaluating CWA implementation and effectiveness addresses many of
these issues in significant detail, 124 several examples at each level of
activity illustrate the point adequately.
a.

Legislative Changes to Implementing Tools

Congress has not changed the 1972 CWA from a broad structural
perspective in the ensuing four decades.125 The principal aspirations
described above remain in place verbatim, although Congress added
other policy guidance, primarily to clarify the relative roles of the states
and the federal government in areas of land and water policy. 126 The
basic dualities of the CWA statutory scheme remain in place: the
technology-based and water quality-based approach to point source
permitting, 127 and the combined efforts to control point source and
nonpoint source pollution 128 with comprehensive planning and

123. Captions from major lawsuits challenging early CWA implementation illustrate this point.
See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) (challenging EPA’s practice
of establishing enforceable effluent limitations for industrial sources by industry-wide regulation
rather than individual facility permits); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(challenging stringency of effluent limitations for paper industry); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556
F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977) (challenging regulation of heat in effluent discharges); Am. Petrol. Inst. v.
EPA, 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976) (challenging general applicability of effluent limitations for
existing sources); Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (challenging EPA
application of CWA variance provisions); Am. Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (challenging EPA authority to adopt effluent limitations guidelines for potato processing
industry); Am. Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975) (challenging stringency of effluent
limitations guidelines for slaughterhouses and meat packing facilities).
124. See supra note 14 for examples.
125. Congress did amend numerous important details of statutory implementation described
below, in 1977, 1981, and 1987, with less comprehensive amendments at other times. See Water
Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7, 7–90; Municipal Wastewater Treatment
Construction Grant Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-117, 95 Stat. 1623, 1623–34; Clean Water
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, 1566–612. The major CWA reauthorization
originally scheduled for 1992, however, has yet to occur more than two decades after that deadline.
126. See Clean Water Act of 1977, sec. 5(a), § 101(g), 91 Stat. at 1567 (amendment clarifying the
relationship between CWA and state water rights and allocations).
127. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1314, 1316 (2006) (imposing effluent limitations on industrial
and municipal point sources based on both “best technology” obligations and water quality needs).
128. See id. (establishing point source control requirements); id. §§ 1288, 1319 (establishing
nonpoint source control programs).
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accountability measures to ensure that the sum of the parts was at least
as large as necessary to achieve the statutory goals. 129
Details always matter, of course, and in 1977 and 1981 Congress
amended the statute in ways that effectively changed “zero-discharge”
from reality to aspiration with respect to the majority of point source
discharges. In the 1977 amendments, Congress added an intermediate
level of industrial pollution treatment requirements known as “best
conventional treatment” (BCT) 130 for the most common water pollutants
by volume. 131 Although zero-discharge requirements technically remain
in the statute for toxic and nonconventional pollutants 132 and for new
sources, 133 given the large volumes of conventional pollutants that
remain in industrial waste streams, BCT arguably signaled the death
knell for zero-discharge requirements for many industrial sources. 134
Similarly, in the 1981 amendments that focused largely on the
municipal wastewater program, 135 Congress eliminated the second,
stricter round of technology-based treatment requirements for publiclyowned treatment plants. 136 In doing so, Congress effectively abandoned
its original vision of requiring municipal wastewater recycling and reuse
as a path to zero-discharge. 137 In addition, Congress added a series of
variance provisions to the otherwise uniform program of technology-

129. See id. § 1281 (establishing requirements for area-wide waste treatment planning); id.
§ 1288 (establishing requirement for comprehensive water pollution control plans); id. § 1313(d)–
(e) (establishing requirements for TMDLs and continuing state planning programs); id. § 1329
(requiring state nonpoint source pollution control plans).
130. See id. §§ 1311(b)(2)(E), 1314(b)(4) (establishing requirements for effluent limitations
based on the best conventional pollution control technology).
131. The statute identifies conventional pollutants as biological oxygen demand, suspended
solids, fecal coliform, and pH, and authorized EPA to identify additional conventional pollutants by
regulation. Id. § 1314(a)(4).
132. See id. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (requiring elimination of discharges of toxic and nonconventional
pollutants wherever technologically and economically achievable).
133. See id. § 1316(a) (requiring zero-discharge from new sources where practicable).
134. As discussed below, EPA did adopt zero-discharge requirements for a relatively small
number of industrial point source categories. See Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation
Council, 557 U.S. 261, 268–71 (2009).
135. Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97117, 95 Stat. 1623, 1623–34.
136. Id. sec. 21(b), § 301(b)(2)(B), 95 Stat. at 1632.
137. For cases discussing the tension between the more ambitious recycling and reuse goals for
POTWs and the practicalities of addressing raw sewage discharges in the short term, see
Montgomery Environmental Coalition v. Costle, 646 F.2d 568 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Environmental
Defense Fund v. Costle, 439 F. Supp. 980 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); City of North Miami v. Train, 377 F.
Supp. 1264 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
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based treatment controls, 138 thereby allowing even further divergence
from zero-discharge as EPA and state agencies wrote individual NPDES
permits. Finally, Congress ultimately adopted a much more flexible set
of control requirements for contaminated storm water discharges, 139
although those pollution sources arguably fall somewhere in between
traditional point sources and nonpoint sources because they channel
pollution from large urban areas or industrial sites into surface waters
through pipes or other point sources. 140
Some history is necessary to put these legislative changes in
perspective, because these seemingly large changes in legislative policy
just five years apart were not quite as abrupt as might appear. When the
1972 amendments were being debated, the National Water Commission
raised serious doubts about the wisdom and cost-effectiveness of a zerodischarge goal. 141 In the 1972 Act, Congress commissioned a “midcourse review” study to evaluate this and other issues. 142 The Senate
Committee explained that the mid-course study might provide it with the
information necessary to evaluate, and if necessary to modify, the zerodischarge goal:
That information will assist the Nation in any decision on the
proper enforcement mechanism to be established to support the
goal, if appropriate, or a decision to refine the date for the
attainment of the goal with greater precision, if required, or the
extent of the exceptions to that goal, if any, or whether the costs
associated with reaching this ultimate standard, in some
instances, may far outweigh the benefits derived. In the interim,
the goal set forth in Section 101 should provide the
Administrator and the States with the direction and the mandate
to direct research efforts toward developing the technology to
138. E.g., Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, sec. 306, § 301, 101 Stat. 7, 35–37
(authorizing modifications of industrial effluent limitations based on “fundamentally different
factors” from those used in promulgating categorical effluent limitations); Clean Water Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-217, sec. 43, § 301(g), 91 Stat. 1566, 1583 (providing modifications of effluent
limitations for certain pollutants); id. sec. 44, § 301(h), 91 Stat. at 1584 (providing secondary
treatment modifications for ocean discharges).
139. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2006).
140. This legislative change responded in part to EPA’s administrative strategy of exempting
large categories of point source discharges from the NPDES program. See infra notes 159–164 and
accompanying text.
141. NAT’L WATER COMM’N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION
70–71 (1973) [hereinafter NAT’L WATER COMM’N].
142. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, sec. 2,
§ 305, 86 Stat. 816, 853–54 (adding CWA § 305).
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apply a no-discharge standard. Without a clearly set goal of
natural water quality achieved through application of a nodischarge policy, it is not likely that resources will be applied to
develop the means necessary to achieve an environmentally and
ecologically sound water quality goal. 143
Congress also appointed a National Commission on Water Quality “to
study the implications of achieving or not achieving the 1983
requirements.” 144 In the 1977 and 1981 amendments, Congress acted on
the information provided by adopting the intermediate BCT standard and
eliminating stricter technology-based controls for POTWs. 145 It is more
difficult to reconcile why Congress retained the zero-discharge
aspiration while weakening the statutory implementing tools necessary
to achieve the goal. Apparently, Congress elected to retain the overall
aspiration 146 in the hopes that technology would improve over a longer
period of time, while bowing to practicality and cost concerns in shortterm practice. If that were the case, at least in theory technology-based
standards should continue to be tightened over time, but as discussed
below, that has rarely been the case. 147
Congress also backed off on its initially bold policy pronouncements
in the area of nonpoint source pollution control. In the 1972 Act,
Congress designed nonpoint source control provisions that were not
nearly as stringent as those it adopted for point sources. 148 In large part,
Congress chose this strategy out of deference to state and local land use
policy and the hope that the states would take aggressive action to
control this half of the water pollution problem on their own. 149
However, Congress also suggested strongly that stricter provisions
would be forthcoming if state programs proved insufficient. 150
143. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 11–12 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3678.
144. S. REP. NO. 95-370, at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4327; see also
NAT’L COMM’N ON WATER QUALITY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON WATER QUALITY 13 (1976).
145. See supra notes 130–137 and accompanying text.
146. In 1977, the Senate Committee indicated its view that “[l]ittle contained in the study of the
[National Commission on Water Quality] could be construed as justifying major changes in the
direction established in 1972.” S. REP. NO. 95-370, at 1, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4327.
147. See infra notes 172–173 and accompanying text.
148. See 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (2006) (providing for state water quality management plans to address,
inter alia, nonpoint source pollution, but with no specific mandates).
149. See S. REP. NO. 95-370, at 9, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4335 (indicating that the
1977 committee continued to believe “that these matters were appropriately left to the level of
government closest to the sources of the problem”).
150. In 1971, Congress expressed its strong expectation that state controls “will be applied as
soon as possible.” S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 39 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3706.
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Unfortunately, Congress failed to make good on this implicit promise
to strengthen controls on polluted runoff (nonpoint sources) if states
failed to do so themselves. The congressional response in the 1977
amendments was to give states more time to tackle an admittedly
difficult set of issues. 151 A decade later, Congress finally stepped in with
new requirements governing state nonpoint source pollution control
programs. 152 Those requirements, however, while more specific than
those adopted in the 1972 law, continued to defer almost entirely to state
prerogatives, and lacked the kind of federal backup provisions that were
built into the point source and water quality standards programs. 153 As a
result, progress in controlling nonpoint source pollution—which is
clearly essential to achieving the overarching statutory goal of chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters—continues to
lag significantly behind efforts to regulate point source discharges. 154
b.

Administrative Tempering of Statutory Goals

Administrative agencies often face the daunting task of implementing
statutes with ambitious goals in the face of practical reality. Given the
degree of aspiration Congress pronounced in the CWA relative to the
magnitude of the task, that was certainly the case for EPA, the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, 155 and state and interstate water quality
agencies. Nevertheless, in a number of significant respects, the failure of
aspiration in the CWA might be attributed to excessive timidity in
agency administration of the Act in the face of pressure from those who
would bear the costs of implementation. It may be legitimate for an
agency to interpret ambiguous statutory commands under a lens of
pragmatism, 156 but that practice is more questionable when the effect is
to substantially temper the goals and purposes Congress set forth in the
151. See S. REP. NO. 95-370, at 9, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4335.
152. 33 U.S.C. § 1329.
153. Compare id. (authorizing federal efforts to identify waters impaired by nonpoint source
pollution but not federal control programs), with id. § 1313(c) (authorizing federal adoption of water
quality standards in states that failed to do so adequately), and id. § 1342(c)–(d) (authorizing federal
veto of deficient state NPDES permits or federal NPDES programs in states that fail to administer
the point source control program adequately).
154. See William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act Been a Success?,
55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 593 (2004); Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 14, at 132–33; David Zaring,
Note, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The Clean Water Act’s
Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 521–28 (1996).
155. As discussed infra notes 181–199, Congress delegated to the Secretary of the Army the task
of implementing section 404 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, in conjunction with EPA.
156. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864–66 (1984).
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law. 157 Although the full history of CWA implementation at the
administrative agency level would be voluminous, and would require an
extensive analysis of implementation by the states as well, 158 a few key
examples illustrate the point.
Achieving the goal of zero-discharge from point sources turned on
two categories of implementing actions. First, the agencies needed to
identify all point sources and require them to obtain NPDES permits so
that the combination of treatment obligations set forth in the statute
could be implemented and enforced. Second, the agencies had to
promulgate treatment regulations designed to achieve zero-discharge
over time as technology improved, and to implement those obligations
through NPDES permits. In both respects, there was a significant failure
of implementation, and hence of aspiration.
First, arguing administrative infeasibility, EPA defined the term
“point source” by regulation in ways that exempt large categories of
dischargers from the permit program, or subject them to less specific
control obligations pursuant to general permits that cover large groups of
dischargers categorically. 159 Categories of point sources EPA thereby
excluded from the full sweep of the NPDES program, or in some cases
from any permit requirement at all, include concentrated agricultural
feeding operations (CAFOs), 160 concentrated aquatic animal production
facilities, 161 aquaculture facilities, 162 municipal storm water
discharges, 163 and silvicultural operations. 164 Exempting large groups of
dischargers from the permitting program might make it more feasible to
achieve the congressional zero-discharge goal for those sources that
157. See David M. Driesen, Purposeless Construction, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97 (2013)
(critiquing the Supreme Court’s increasing tendency to construe statutes without considering
statutory purposes).
158. States have the authority to implement numerous CWA programs. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(c) (state review of water quality standards); id. § 1342(b) (state NPDES permitting
program); id. §1344(g) (state administration of the section 404 dredge and fill program); see also
supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing various state planning programs).
159. Compare Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1337–38 (2013)
(upholding EPA’s decision to exempt from NPDES permit requirement channelized discharges
from logging roads), with Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1379, 1381–82
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (overruling EPA’s decisions to exclude categories of point sources form NPDES
program based on principles of feasibility, but authorizing use of general or area-wide permits).
160. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 (2012); Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 750–51
(5th Cir. 2011).
161. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.24.
162. See id. § 122.25.
163. See id. § 122.26.
164. See id. § 122.27.
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remain regulated. Equally clearly, however, that practice weakens the
overall statutory goal of eliminating as many pollutant discharges as
possible.
Second, even for those large categories of dischargers that EPA
included in the NPDES program, very few have been subject to
enforceable zero-discharge requirements. A quick perusal of the detailed
regulations EPA adopts to define effluent limitations for various
categories of industrial point sources demonstrates that the vast majority
allow significant ongoing discharges. 165 In the legislative history of the
1972 amendments, Congress expressed that it understood the limitations
of end-of-pipe treatment technology, and its accompanying expectation
that the first round of BPT regulations would reduce, but rarely
eliminate, pollutant discharges. 166 However, Congress also
communicated a clear expectation that recycling and reuse of waste
materials and other process changes—in lieu of end-of-pipe waste
treatment—would allow the elimination of discharges of pollutants to
surface waters from industrial processes in the BAT and NSPS rounds of
rulemaking for industrial sources. 167
Third, the entire system of industrial technology-based standards
arguably has ossified to a significant degree. Implementation of
industrial effluent limitations has reduced surface water discharges
significantly, 168 and EPA continues to adopt new standards for industries
previously subject only to facility-by-facility analysis. 169 The
congressional expectations for zero-discharge, however, have not been
met. Even the initial expectation that BAT requirements would exceed
BPT did not always materialize, and in many effluent limitations
guidelines the two sets of standards are identical or nearly so. 170 When
Congress added BCT to the mix of industrial treatment standards, it
165. See id. pts. 405–17.
166. See S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 42–44 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3710–11.
167. See id. at 45–46, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3711–12.
168. See supra Part III.A.1.
169. In section 402(a) of the CWA, Congress authorized permits “prior to the taking of necessary
implementing actions . . . [based on] such conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary
to carry out the provisions of this chapter.” 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2006). Known more
colloquially as “best professional judgment” or “BPJ” effluent limitations, Congress intended
individual permit writers to estimate the applicable effluent limitations for facilities until EPA
promulgated the intended categorical regulations for that category of facility. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.44(a)(1). However, EPA still has not promulgated regulatory effluent limitations for all
industrial point sources, despite additional urging from Congress in the 1987 amendments. See 33
U.S.C. § 1314(m) (requiring EPA to complete the task of adopting industrial effluent limitations
guidelines).
170. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 410.12, 410.13 (BPT and BAT effluent limitations identical).
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became even less likely that the second round of treatment standards
would result in zero-discharge, despite the continued zero-discharge
preference in BAT and NSPS standards for toxic pollutants. 171
Moreover, EPA has not followed through with Congress’s
expectation that treatment technology would improve over time, leading
to increasingly stringent effluent limitation requirements over time until
the ultimate goal of zero-discharge was achieved. Although EPA has
adopted relatively small changes to some industrial standards over time,
many effluent limitations regulations remain identical to those
promulgated decades ago. 172 It is certainly possible that Congress simply
over-estimated the potential for innovation in water pollution control
methods from 1972 forward, but advances in many other areas of
engineering and technology suggest otherwise. By analogy, if telephone
technology were dictated by similar federal regulatory standards, we
would be stuck with the same fixed location telephones that existed in
the mid-1970s, perhaps having advanced from rotary dial to push tone
technology but nowhere close to modern smart phones. In the case of
pollution controls, that tendency has generated a robust academic debate
about the relative technology-forcing characteristics of prescriptive or
proscriptive regulation compared to effluent fees or other economic
incentives. 173 For purposes of this Article, however, the fact remains that
the system of technology-based standards Congress hoped would drive
steadily toward zero-discharge remains stuck in the world of end-of-pipe
treatment, nowhere close to the intended statutory goal.
EPA’s track record in implementing the water quality standards side
of the CWA implementation scheme, in particular the effort to achieve
fishable and swimmable waters wherever attainable by 1983, is similarly
mixed. EPA’s regulations governing state water quality standards are
admirably firm in some respects. For example, EPA interprets the term
“wherever attainable” quite strictly. States may adopt water-body-use
171. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pt. 405 (Dairy Products Processing Point Source Category, promulgated
1974 and amended once in 1995); id. pt. 406 (Grain Mills Point Source Category, last amended
1995); id. pt. 407 (Canned and Preserved Fruits and Vegetables Processing Point Source Category,
last amended 1995).
173. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988) (arguing that economic
incentives would generate more innovation than technology-based regulations); D. Bruce La Pierre,
Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771 (1977)
(critiquing the degree of innovation generated by Clean Air Act automobile standards). But see
Wendy A. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83 (lauding
the effectiveness of technology-based standards in generating innovation and leveling the playing
field among dischargers).
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designations and accompanying water-quality criteria less stringent than
necessary to protect fishable and swimmable waters only under narrowly
confined circumstances that amount largely to physical impossibility due
to natural conditions. 174 States are required to adopt and implement
standards for a wide range of contaminants and to protect a range of
typical water-body uses. 175
On the other hand, progress toward actual attainment of those water
quality standards remains largely stuck in the same place it has been for
several decades: large percentages of U.S. surface waters continue to
exceed applicable water quality standards or otherwise fail to attain
designated uses. 176 One obvious explanation for this status, discussed
elsewhere in this Article, is the ineffective approach to the nonpoint
source pollution responsible for a large percentage of water body
impairment nationally. 177 From an administrative perspective, however,
EPA delayed for several decades implementation of the comprehensive
accounting and control regimen (TMDLs) designed to attain water
quality standards in those waters for which the first round of technologybased effluent limitations were insufficient to do so. 178 Even after EPA
began to take the TMDL program seriously, goaded in large part by a
rash of citizen suits, 179 it declined to adopt a firm requirement that
TMDLs include implementation plans similar to those designed to
address the analogous problem of aggregate pollution in the CAA. 180
The section 404 permitting program 181 is another key example of a
major statutory program that has arguably been subverted in ways that
contravene the basic aspirations Congress set forth in the 1972 CWA.
Technically, section 404 simply provides a second permitting
mechanism (in addition to NPDES permits) through which the Secretary
174. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(g).
175. See id. §§ 131.10, 131.11.
176. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 148–154 and accompanying text.
178. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006). For an excellent, detailed history of the reasons for this delay
and the ensuing battle over TMDL program implementation, see OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN
WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION (2d ed. 2002). See also Kelly
Seaburg, Murky Waters: Courts Should Hold That the “Any-Progress-Is-Sufficient-Progress”
Approach to TMDL Development Under Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act Is Arbitrary and
Capricious, 82 WASH. L. REV. 767 (2007).
179. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ga. 1996); Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Fox, 909 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. Reilly, 796 F.
Supp. 1374 (W.D. Wash. 1992), aff’d, 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994).
180. See Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air
Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203 (1999).
181. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
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of the Army (in practice through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) can
authorize discharges of certain limited categories of pollutants,
specifically “dredged or fill material” into navigable waters at “specified
disposal sites.” 182 The Corps is supposed to issue only those permits that
are in compliance with guidelines promulgated by EPA, designed to
protect the integrity of the nation’s waters from a wide variety of adverse
effects, 183 and subject to EPA’s authority to prohibit disposal at certain
sites when necessary to prevent “unacceptable adverse effects” to the
nation’s waters. 184
Initially, the Corps of Engineers exempted from the section 404
permitting program any discharges to wetlands by defining the “waters
of the United States” as waters that were navigable in fact.185 But
wetlands comprise ecologically critical portions of the nation’s waters
and are essential to fulfill the statutory goal of restoring the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of those waters. 186 The agencies
amended the program to include wetlands only after environmental
groups successfully challenged that practice in court, 187 and that
regulatory effort, in turn, has generated a running legal battle over which
wetlands are properly covered by the program. 188
Even after those regulations went into effect, however, the program
has not been implemented in a way that has effectively promoted the
statutory objective of restoring and maintaining the physical, chemical,
or biological integrity of the nation’s waters. For perspective, NPDES
permits typically allow limited discharges of pollutants into flowing
water bodies, where the resulting impairment must be limited by the
combination of technology-based and water quality-based control
requirements. 189 Section 404 permits, by contrast, often allow discharges
of dredged and fill material that can fill water bodies entirely, thus
resulting in their complete destruction. 190 It is difficult to conceptualize a
182. Id. § 1344(a).
183. Id. § 1344(b).
184. Id. § 1344(c).
185. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985).
186. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WETLANDS: CHARACTERISTICS AND BOUNDARIES 42
(1995).
187. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (2012) (defining “waters of the United States” as including
wetlands for purposes of the section 404 permit program); 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (July 25, 1975)
(describing regulatory history in the wake of Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F.
Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975)).
188. See infra notes 212–215 and accompanying text.
189. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
190. 33 C.F.R. § 323.3 (2012). Indeed, the definition of “fill material” is material that “has the
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program that is less consistent with the overall statutory aspiration of the
CWA than one that allows entire water bodies, or significant portions of
them, to be destroyed entirely.
EPA’s section 404(b) regulations 191 include a long series of
constraints designed to guard against this perverse result to some extent.
Two of those constraints are most pertinent here. First, by prohibiting
the issuance of section 404 permits when “a practicable alternative[s] to
the proposed discharge” would accomplish the same project purpose, 192
particularly for projects that do not depend on access to water, 193 EPA’s
intent is to eliminate unnecessary wetland fills and thereby to maintain
the integrity of those waters. In practice, the vast majority of section 404
permits are issued, with what some have decried as a highly ineffective
evaluation of alternatives, 194 resulting in what appears to be more of a
presumption that wetlands can be destroyed rather than the opposite.
Nevertheless, the filling of America’s wetlands slowed following
application of the section 404 permitting program to wetland fills, and
although scientists remain cautious about comparing the functional
values of wetlands as opposed to raw acreage, some net gains in
wetlands acreage have been reported more recently. 195
Second, the EPA and Corps of Engineers regulations governing the
section 404 program attempt to offset any ecological harm resulting
from wetland fills by mandating the implementation of “compensatory
mitigation” sufficient to replace the wetlands values and functions lost or
damaged because of the fill. 196 Restoring or replacing wetlands values
and functions is no easy task, however, and the efficacy of compensatory
mitigation has been questioned from a scientific perspective. 197 In 2008,
effect of . . . (i) [r]eplacing any portion of a water of the United States with dry land; or (ii)
[c]hanging the bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the United States.” Id. § 323.2(e)(1).
191. 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.
192. Id. § 230.10(a).
193. Id. § 230.10(a)(3).
194. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives Under Section 404 of
the Clean Water Act and Similar Environmental Laws, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 773 (1989).
195. See T.E. DAHL, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN
THE CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES 1998 TO 2004, at 43–46 (2006) (reporting modest net gains in
wetlands acreage from 1998–2004 but noting predominant gains in freshwater ponds relative to
other wetland types, and declining to evaluate wetland quality); COMM. ON MITIGATING WETLAND
LOSSES, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT 16–20 (2001) [hereinafter COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES] (reporting trend of
historical wetland losses that the Corps of Engineers reports will be reversed due to compensatory
mitigation, but reserving judgment on the efficacy of mitigation due to insufficiency of data).
196. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 230, subpt. J (Compensatory Mitigation for Loss of Aquatic Resources).
197. See COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES, supra note 195, at 22–45, 70–73 (concluding
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EPA and the Corps revised their regulations governing compensatory
mitigation in response to legislation requiring greater accountability in
the program. 198 Although the new regulations include significantly
stricter standards and procedures for compensatory mitigation, 199 it is
probably too early to evaluate how much better the new program will be
in fulfilling CWA aspirations.
Finally, no statutory or regulatory regime is likely to fulfill its goals
absent adequate enforcement against parties who fail to comply with
statutory or regulatory obligations. The CWA confers on EPA the
authority to prosecute violations through administrative, civil, and
criminal processes, 200 and further provides for citizen suits as a
supplementary enforcement tool. 201 Evaluating the effectiveness of
statutory enforcement is difficult, but at least some commentators have
argued persuasively that some of the aspirations of the CWA have been
subverted by inadequate enforcement as well as insufficient
administrative implementation. 202
c.

Judicial Deference

The judicial branch arguably has also played a role in subverting the
aspirations of the CWA in two separate respects. First, courts routinely
uphold EPA’s decisions to construe the statute narrowly in the face of
political or pragmatic considerations. Second, the judicial branch itself—
led by the Supreme Court—has at times interpreted the statute in ways
that appear to run afoul of the key aspirations that Congress set forth in
the opening provisions of the law.
The standards of review articulated by the Supreme Court in the field
of federal administrative law admittedly suggest judicial deference to
agency interpretation of ambiguous statutes. 203 The problem, as
Professor Driesen has suggested, is that goals provisions are a part of

that restoration is easier for some wetland types relative to others, and that it is difficult to track
mitigation success).
198. Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594 (Apr. 10,
2008) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 325 and 332; 40 C.F.R. pt. 230).
199. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.93 (establishing general requirements for compensatory mitigation); id.
§ 230.95 (establishing ecological performance standards for wetland mitigation).
200. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006).
201. Id. § 1365.
202. See, e.g., Drelich, supra note 13; Flatt, supra note 13.
203. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983);
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).

04 - Adler Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

ASPIRATION IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT

10/10/2013 10:49 AM

793

statutes. 204 They should mean something, and agencies and courts alike
should consider them in interpreting statutory provisions that might be
ambiguous in isolation, but are not when read in conjunction with the
statutory goals.
I certainly do not mean to suggest that the federal executive is always
wrong in its interpretation of ambiguous CWA provisions, or even that it
is wrong most of the time. As is true with respect to all of the complex
environmental statutes Congress has entrusted EPA with administering,
the job is difficult and fraught with delicate balancing acts. However,
there are several important examples of cases in which the courts have
deferred to agency interpretations of the CWA that arguably contravene
the statutory goals. 205
One prominent example is Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska
Conservation Council, 206 in which the Supreme Court upheld a joint
decision by EPA and the Corps of Engineers that subverted the zerodischarge aspiration of the CWA. The case involved one of the rare
instances in which EPA’s effluent limitations guidelines for a category
of discharger mandated zero discharge. 207 The agencies, however,
allowed the discharger to circumvent the zero-discharge requirement by
authorizing the discharge pursuant to a section 404 permit rather than a
section 402 permit, thus allowing entirely untreated discharges of mine
tailings into a pristine Alaskan lake.208 The federal district court in
Alaska upheld the agency’s action but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed in an opinion that focused strongly on the statutory
goals and purposes. 209 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals, deferring to the agencies despite the rather clear divergence
between the agency decision and the statutory aspiration of zero-

204. See Driesen, supra note 157.
205. See Mark A. Latham, (Un)restoring the Chemical, Physical, and Biological Integrity of Our
Nation’s Waters: The Emerging Clean Water Act Jurisprudence of the Roberts Court, 28 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 411 (2010); Mark Squillace, The Judicial Assault on the Clean Water Act, FED. LAW.,
July 2012, at 33.
206. 557 U.S. 261, 291 (2009). In the interest of full disclosure, I co-authored an amicus brief
urging the Supreme Court, unsuccessfully, to uphold the decision of the Ninth Circuit below. See
Brief for the Honorable G. Tracy Meehan, Former Assistant Administrator for Water at the EPA as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council,
557 U.S. 261 (2009) (Nos. 07-984 and 07-990).
207. 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(b)(1) (2012) (prohibiting discharges of process wastes from new source
mines using the froth flotation treatment process).
208. Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 268–71.
209. Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 486 F.3d 638, 644–45 (9th
Cir. 2007).
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discharge wherever possible. 210
The Supreme Court has also acted more affirmatively to curtail the
reach of the CWA in a series of cases narrowing the potential geographic
reach of the statute. 211 The details and potential impact of those
decisions, in which the Court specifically declined to defer to agency
interpretations of the CWA and instead relied on other modes of
statutory construction, 212 have been reviewed extensively elsewhere. 213
For purposes of this analysis, those cases are noteworthy because they
arguably contravene the principles of judicial review the courts have
relied on not only to uphold the agency’s own subversion of CWA
aspirations, but to justify independent judicial subversion of those goals
as well. In particular, by excluding from CWA jurisdiction wetlands that
provide essential ecological and hydrological functions to the nation’s
water systems and aquatic ecosystems, 214 and by potentially narrowing
the scope of what discharges of pollutants into water bodies require
permits, the Court has jeopardized the overarching statutory aspiration of
restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the nation’s waters.
2.

The Pathology of Excessive Aspiration?

A second, far less complicated but equally viable, reason for the
failure of aspiration in the CWA may be that we fail to meet the kinds of
aspirations Congress sometimes embeds into statutes because they are
written with so much aspiration. Although seemingly counter-intuitive,
this theory suggests that the agency officials and others charged with
210. Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 291; see also Chantz Martin, Comment, The Clean Water Act
Suffers a Crushing Blow: The U.S. Supreme Court Clears the Way for the Mining Industry to
Pollute U.S. Waters [Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458
(2009)], 49 WASHBURN L.J. 933 (2010).
211. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (split opinions interpreting the relative
degree of nexus required between isolated waters and navigable waters to warrant CWA
jurisdiction); S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004)
(holding that discharges must be to “meaningfully distinct” bodies of water to require NPDES
permits); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)
(invalidating regulatory interpretation justifying CWA jurisdiction based on use by migratory birds).
212. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739 (relying on dictionary definition of “waters” rather than
agency’s regulatory definition in order to read the statute narrowly); Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S.
at 172–73 (reading CWA narrowly to avoid constitutional interpretation rather than employing
traditional principles of deference).
213. See THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT: FIVE ESSAYS (L. Kinvin Wroth ed.,
2007); Colburn, supra note 14.
214. See PATRICK COMER ET AL., NATURESERVE, BIODIVERSITY VALUES OF GEOGRAPHICALLY
ISOLATED WETLANDS IN THE UNITED STATES (2005).

04 - Adler Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

ASPIRATION IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT

10/10/2013 10:49 AM

795

implementation of the statute believe that the goals are so ambitious that
they cannot possibly be met. As a result, no one actually tries, or even
takes the goals very seriously. Instead, the entities that implement the
law (agencies, courts, etc.) set their own more “realistic” goals that
effectively become the real goals of the statute. Collectively, we either
ridicule the aspirations set forth in the statute as political posturing by
members of Congress, or give them a “wink and a nod” but ignore them
in practice. Others have explained this phenomenon by arguing that
ambitious statutory aspirations allow Congress to act virtuous while
leaving the agencies with the difficult task of implementing those
goals. 215 Instead of consuming the entire statutory banquet and paying
the full bill, the agencies go on a diet, or perhaps order a la carte.
This theory is supported by the generally negative reaction of the
professional water resources community to the aspirations in the CWA,
as reflected in the final report of the National Water Commission to the
President and to Congress submitted in June 1973, just eight months
after the 1972 legislation. 216 With respect to the overall objective and
definition of pollution, the Commission candidly reported: “This is not a
good standard on which to base the definition of pollution.” 217 The
report was even more critical of the zero-discharge goal: “The
Commission believes adoption of ‘no discharge’ as a national goal for
water quality management is no more sound than would be the
establishment of a ‘no development’ goal for controlling land use.” 218
More specifically, the Commission expressed the view that the zerodischarge aspiration was not attainable given available technology, and
that Congress assumed without proper justification that water was more
valuable than other resources that might be impaired in meeting the
zero-discharge goal, in an “imputation of an extravagant social value to
an abstract concept of water purity.” 219
By contrast, the National Water Commission expressed a more
favorable—if qualified—view of the fishable and swimmable waters
aspiration: “Standards based on present and proposed water uses not
only represent the most rational national water quality policy from a
cost-benefit standpoint, they also permit maximum adaptability of

215. See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990).
216. NAT’L WATER COMM’N, supra note 141.
217. Id. at 69.
218. Id. at 70.
219. Id. The Commission, by contrast, feared that the costs of attaining the zero-discharge goal
might vastly exceed the benefits. Id.
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national goals to local situations.” 220 This more favorable view of the
water quality-based aspirations of the CWA is qualified because the
Commission believed that the uses to be protected “should be
determined by responsible public authorities.” 221 This perspective differs
from the statutory aspiration in two significant ways. First, the
Commission apparently believed that individual states or localities
should make the value-based determinations of which uses were
appropriate in which water bodies, in contrast to the national goal of
fishable and swimmable waters articulated by Congress. Second, the
Commission did not endorse the idea that the fishable and swimmable
goal should apply presumptively to all waters “wherever attainable.” 222
Rather, the Commission believed that some water bodies could be
designated for agricultural use, industrial use, or even “disposal and
transport of wastes.” 223 Thus, even though the Commission endorsed
water quality aspirations in concept, its version of the concept was far
more flexible and less ambitious than that expressed by Congress in the
1972 law. 224
In other words, perhaps those more modest goals were what “the
experts” in the water quality arena expected from the start. In their view,
it was possible to reduce the volume and toxicity of water pollution
discharges through adoption of the best available technology, but it
would be a waste of society’s resources to eliminate those discharges
entirely, if that goal was attainable at all. Likewise, it was reasonable
and pragmatic to establish targets for improved water quality based on
220. Id. at 71.
221. Id. at 70.
222. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (2006).
223. Id. Even under the current CWA system as implemented by EPA regulations states must
adopt designated uses that include agricultural and industrial purposes. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(a)
(2012). However, states still must designate waters for fishable and swimmable uses wherever
attainable. See id. § 131.2. States may not designate waters for “waste transport or waste
assimilation” uses. Id. § 131.10(a). Moreover, because the most stringent applicable water quality
criterion governs in any water body, id. §§ 131.11, 131.12, it is quite different to allow less
protective uses as part of a suite of designated uses than to allow them as the only use that dictates
the stringency of water quality criteria that apply to that water body.
224. An anecdote based on personal recollection suggests that similar views persisted long after
the 1972 legislative debate, and undoubtedly to this day. I served as Vice Chairman of Water
Quality 2000, a multi-interest group policy forum on national water pollution control issues
convened by the Water Environment Federation and others. See WATER QUALITY 2000, WATER
ENVIRONMENT FEDERATION, A NATIONAL WATER AGENDA FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, FINAL
REPORT (1992). At the opening meeting of that set of policy discussions, I recall an industry
representative expressing the opinion that the goal of restoring the complete chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the nation’s waters would require a return to Pre-Columbian conditions in the
United States, and that the zero discharge goal violated the second law of thermodynamics.
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the actual desired beneficial uses of various water bodies, but not
reasonable to expect that each water body should be treated the same.
The uses and values of water bodies differ, as do the costs and feasibility
of the improvements needed to attain other uses. If this view is accurate,
one might argue that it is what was realistic all along; it is what we got
out of the CWA in its first four decades; and we should be happy with
the result—waterways that are far cleaner and more usable than they
were in 1971, without having exhausted limited resources to tilt at the
windmills of zero-discharge or complete restoration of the nation’s
waters regardless of context or cost.
The fundamental problem with this perspective of realism over
aspiration is one of political legitimacy. Although this possible
explanation for the failure to achieve the aspirations in the 1972 CWA
may seem similar to the “balance of power” explanation, it actually
differs in one important respect. The balance of power theory can be
explained—although not justified—as a form of slow “policy creep,” a
series of discrete decisions on individual regulatory issues influenced by
the effective and well-funded or politically powerful advocacy of
interest groups trying to minimize their implementation costs. As such, it
does not necessarily reflect an intentional or considered policy to subvert
the aspirations Congress set forth in the statute. The end result might be
the same or similar, but at least it would not represent an intentional
effort by the administrative or judicial officials, or both, to refute the will
of the elected legislature.
If the “excessive aspiration” explanation for the failure of CWA
aspiration is correct, that reflects a far more serious and illegitimate
subversion of the democratic process. Congress adopted, and the
President signed into law, the aspirations set forth in section 101(a) of
the CWA. 225 Neither the National Water Commission nor the
Administrator of EPA—or even the President of the United States—
possesses the authority to supplant those policy aspirations with less
ambitious ones, however unwise they think them to be. If Congress
intended those aspirations to be interpreted and implemented literally,
the only legitimate remedy is to convince Congress to temper those
aspirations by amending the statute. The conclusion may be different,
however, as suggested in the following subsection, if Congress included
such ambitious aspirations in the CWA for a different reason.

225. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
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Aspiration as Asymptote

The third potential explanation for the failure of aspiration in the
CWA, somewhat counter-intuitively, is that Congress never actually
believed that the ambitious aspirations in the statutory goals provisions
would be met. Rather, Congress’s strategy was to set such an extremely
high goal in the hope that the goal itself will induce the implementing
agencies and others to achieve the highest standard possible, or at least a
standard higher than otherwise would be attained. If this theory is
correct, we should not worry too much when we fail to achieve the
ultimate statutory aspirations. Rather, we should just keep trying harder
in a continuous, asymptotic quest to get closer and closer to the statutory
goals. Again, this “asymptotic” explanation sounds quite similar to the
excessive aspiration theory, but with a very important difference. Under
the latter theory, those entrusted with implementation of the CWA
ignore the statutory aspirations or replace them with others they believe
to be more realistic. Under the asymptotic theory, the agencies may
adopt individual regulations or policies based on pragmatic realities, but
they do not give up on the aspirations entirely. Instead, they continue to
search for improved solutions in an effort to achieve the statutory
aspirations wherever feasible, or as closely as possible.
There are two main ironies to this explanation for the aspirations
Congress incorporated into the CWA. First, it is the most difficult to
prove because it is really a poker bluff theory. A poker bluff cannot
work if you signal that you are “just kidding.” Likewise, pronouncing a
statutory aspiration as a tool used to prod us to do more will not work if
Congress (or EPA) says publicly that they are “just kidding.” There is
not, therefore, and could not be, any clear indication to that effect in the
legislative history. If the authors of the 1972 legislation intended their
lofty aspirations simply as a means to prod the most aggressive
implementation possible of the operative provisions of the law, clearly
they would not have said so explicitly in either the statutory text or the
legislative history. 226 It does, however, make sense as a potentially
legitimate justification for ambitious aspirations in the CWA and in
other statutes.
If this theory regarding Congress’s purpose in establishing lofty
statutory aspirations is correct, it raises somewhat different questions
about legitimacy. Is it appropriate for Congress to set aspirational goals
that Congress itself views as unattainable? Does this lead to inefficient
226. In the passage quoted above, the 1972 Senate Committee at least hinted that prodding was
one function of the ambitious statutory goals. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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use of scarce resources, and to frustration with the administrative
process if not downright cynicism and a loss of faith in government?
Other commentators have taken varying positions in this debate.
Professor Doremus argued that the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 227 is
not a “failure” because so few species have successfully been recovered;
rather, the recovery aspiration in the ESA serves as a source of
continuing and essential protection for threatened and endangered
species and the habitat that supports them. 228 Similarly, Professor Sinden
argues that absolute aspirations in environmental statutes provide a
necessary counter-balance to powerful interests who seek to subvert
statutory implementation. 229
Professor Schoenbrod, however, critiqued the legislative practice of
establishing broad statutory goals with accompanying orders for an
administrative agency to write complex rules to implement those
aspirations rather than simply adopting rules of conduct directly in the
statute. 230 Similarly, Professor Dwyer criticized Congress’s practice of
adopting “symbolic” legislation to sound virtuous without considering
administrative feasibility and implementation, thus leaving the
implementing agencies to pick up the pieces. 231
To some extent, this debate may turn on the issue discussed above
regarding the legal force and effect of statutory goals and aspirations. 232
If Congress uses purely aspirational language in the provisions that
establish statutory goals and objectives, and intends them to serve as
asymptotic targets that may never be met but nevertheless prod us to
achieve more than we otherwise would, it would appear less appropriate
to consider that text as having enforceable meaning, 233 at least absent
clear indications to the contrary. Those provisions, however, may
continue to serve as general guides to the interpretation of other statutory
provisions. If, on the other hand, Congress “means what it says” in
establishing ambitious statutory goals, and intends them actually to be
227. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006).
228. Holly Doremus, Delisting Endangered Species: An Aspirational Goal, Not a Realistic
Expectation, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,434, 10,435 (2000).
229. Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental
Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1487–511 (2005).
230. David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30
UCLA L. REV. 740 (1983).
231. See Dwyer, supra note 215, at 233–35.
232. See supra Part II.C.
233. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that EPA interpreted the
fishable and swimmable goal in CWA section 101(a)(2) as having enforceable effect pursuant to
specific language in section 303(c) of the Act).
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attained, it seems illegitimate for administrative agencies and courts to
simply ignore them in construing, implementing and enforcing the rest
of the statutory scheme.
III. WE MIGHT RESTORE ASPIRATION TO THE CWA BY
ADOPTING MORE PRECISE AND MORE MEANINGFUL
DEFINITIONS OF GOALS FOR WATER BODIES
Regardless of which of the three explanations (or combinations
thereof) evaluated in Part III are more correct, it remains disturbing that
efforts to attain the broadest aspirations set forth in the CWA appear to
have been “stuck” in largely the same place for several decades. Just as
there are several possible explanations for our collective failure to attain
the aspirations set forth in the CWA over the past four decades, there are
several possible responses to that state of affairs.
First, if we accept the balance of power theory discussed above, 234 we
might simply accept that Congress writes aspirational goals that are
always subject to legal and political push and pull, and can thereby be
subverted to varying degrees. Those interest groups that bear the costs of
CWA implementation (industrial dischargers, municipalities,
landowners subject to the section 404 permitting program, etc.) will
continue to advocate for less expensive—or more cost-effective—
implementation. Environmental groups and other non-governmental
organizations representing user groups (fishing interests, recreationists,
waterside landowners, etc.) will continue to push for more protective
CWA implementation. Taken together, if the political power is balanced
in a reasonable way, this “system” of participatory democracy will, in
theory, produce the best balance under the circumstances. We can accept
this as the reality of statutory implementation in a pluralistic society that
provides opportunities for all affected interests to comment on
administrative actions, challenge them in court if they do not like the
final agency action, or lobby Congress to amend the statute if they do
not like the judicial response. If there is a significant power disparity,
however, one side or the other is likely to shift the fulcrum point, and the
above analysis suggests that the balance has remained on the side of
incomplete CWA implementation taken as a whole.
Second, we could accept the view offered by the National Water
Commission from the outset that the goals Congress set in 1972 were
overly ambitious, and either implicitly (as we arguably have done to

234. See supra Part III.B.1.
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date) or more explicitly (through statutory amendments) revert to a more
“realistic” set of goals we can more reliably meet. 235 Perhaps the zerodischarge goal Congress adopted was unrealistic (if not naïve) from the
outset, although it remains viable to retain the more specific statutory
commands to eliminate certain types of discharges wherever
“technologically and economically achievable”236 without insisting on
zero-discharge in all cases. Similarly, perhaps we need to conduct a form
of triage with respect to the fishable and swimmable goal Congress
adopted in the CWA. For many water bodies that goal has been attained,
and for many others it still may be feasible. For other water bodies,
however, for example those in very heavily urbanized areas or beset by
pervasive nonpoint source pollution or physical and hydrological
modifications, under this approach we should settle for “no longer
flammable.” 237
There are several potential advantages to the approach of backing
away from the most ambitious of the 1972 aspirations. It would probably
be less expensive, although there is considerable evidence that strategies
to eliminate rather than treat waste streams through pollution prevention
strategies such as materials substitution and recycling or reuse can
reduce rather than increase production costs and conserve valuable
resources. 238 It would probably be less controversial and less divisive,
potentially allowing all of the parties responsible for CWA
implementation to focus on effective implementation of the remaining
aspirations. Arguably, people prefer realistic goals for which we can
work reasonably hard and then actually declare success to goals that are
frustratingly difficult if not impossible to attain, thus increasing the
likelihood of actual success.
The problem with these first two potential reactions, however, is that
they prematurely foreclose the possibility that we might achieve the
aspirations Congress adopted in 1972—however impressively ambitious
they may seem to some—by thinking more creatively about approaches
to achieve our initial goals. Perhaps the problem is not with the goals,
but with limitations in the range of strategies we adopted to achieve the
aspirations. Some of those strategies clearly have worked well, and we
235. See supra notes 216–23 and accompanying text.
236. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (2006) (requiring BAT effluent limitations for industrial
point sources of certain pollutants).
237. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Again, I am not asserting that Assistant
Administrator Wilcher was advocating that policy, and I am quite confident she was not.
238. See MARK H. DORFMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL DIVIDENDS: CUTTING MORE CHEMICAL
WASTES (1992).
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should retain and continue to improve them. Others have been far less
successful, and might be revised significantly or replaced entirely. The
most obvious example is the strategies adopted thus far to address
nonpoint source pollution, and much has been written about those
failures. 239
Here, however, I highlight and propose the expansion of a somewhat
different shift in approach, which has been suggested by ongoing
initiatives in CWA implementation. The basic proposed shift in our
overall philosophy of CWA implementation is that the solution to
excessive aspiration is more aspiration, or perhaps more accurately, a
refined approach involving a more site-specific articulation of the
aspirations for particular water bodies, accompanied by more targeted
efforts to meet those redefined aspirations.
A.

Alternative Definitions of CWA Aspirations

One common problem with broad aspirations is that they tend to be
ambitious but vague. As a result, there is little clarity about what the real
goal is, and even less clarity in determining the extent to which they
have been met. How can we determine whether the ultimate aspiration of
the 1972 CWA, to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the nation’s waters, has been met, for individual
water bodies much less the “nation’s waters” as a whole? Even with
respect to some of the subsidiary goals of the CWA, it can be difficult to
define and measure relative success. The zero-discharge goal is
relatively clear, at least as applied to point sources, but when have we
achieved the goal of “fishable and swimmable waters,” or “no toxics in
toxic amounts”? Although more useful definitions of the statutory
aspirations will not in and of themselves magically produce attainment,
as explained further below it is a useful first step in doing so.
There are at least three existing efforts to expand on the CWA
statutory goals in a more precise and specific way. Two of those
initiatives have been only weakly recognized, and the third has been the
subject of considerable analysis but not usually for the reasons I address.

239. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Controlling Nonpoint Water Source Pollution: Is Help on the
Way (From the Courts or EPA)?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,270 (2001); Douglas R. Williams, When
Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail: Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural
Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 21 (2002); Zaring, supra note 154, at
521–28.
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Biological Water Quality Criteria

I have written previously about the degree to which biological water
quality criteria, or “biocriteria,” have both theoretical and practical
advantages in implementing the fundamental statutory aspiration to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the nation’s waters. 240 Rather than repeating those points here, my goal
is to underscore how biocriteria can serve as one tool to define in a more
robust and useful way what the basic statutory aspiration means for
individual waters, and serve as a better measuring tool for determining
the extent to which that aspiration has been met. That tool can reduce the
frustration inherent in what has been a somewhat variable, ill-defined,
and moving target in ascertaining whether the water quality goals of the
CWA have been met in various regions. 241
By way of background, water quality standards are comprised, inter
alia, of designated uses and water quality criteria to define the water
quality conditions necessary to support and protect those uses. 242 The
minimum uses prescribed in CWA section 101(a)(2) establish the
fishable and swimmable goal of the statute, 243 and for purposes of this
analysis it is important to understand that the use of biocriteria does
nothing to subvert that basic requirement, and arguably can do a much
better job of defining it and measuring its attainment than existing forms
of water quality criteria do alone.
States use several forms of water quality criteria to measure use
attainment in water bodies. Narrative water quality criteria like “no
toxics in toxic amounts” establish vague, tort-like standards for water
body conditions. 244 Narrative criteria have the advantage of flexibility
240. See Robert W. Adler, Filling the Gaps in Water Quality Standards: Legal Perspectives on
Biocriteria, in BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT AND CRITERIA, TOOLS FOR WATER RESOURCE PLANNING
AND DECISION MAKING 345, 358 (Wayne S. Davis & Thomas P. Simon eds., 1995); Robert W.
Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive Objectives of Physical and
Biological Integrity, 33 ENVTL. L. 29, 70–75 (2003).
241. See Steven F. Hayward, 2011 ALMANAC OF ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS, at x, 129, 131–32
(2011) (bemoaning the lack of consistent, reliable data on water quality and other environmental
trends in the United States); V. Kerry Smith & Carlos Valcarcel Wolloh, Has Surface Water Quality
Improved Since the Clean Water Act? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18,192,
2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18192 (concluding that water quality has not
changed markedly since the CWA was passed, but that insufficient monitoring systems and data are
available to draw firm conclusions).
242. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (2012). Depending on some semantics
of definition, an anti-degradation program can also be considered a component of a state’s water
quality standards. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12.
243. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).
244. See EPA, EPA-823-B-94-005a ,WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, 3-2, 3-24 to 3-
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because they are not bound by particular numeric limits. For example, a
state might prove that the combination of toxic pollutants in a water
body cause harm even if numeric criteria for individual contaminants are
met. Narrative criteria beg the question on issues such as “how toxic is
toxic,” however, and therefore require the kinds of difficult evidence
typically required of tort-like standards. That limitation is particularly
important in implementing the CWA’s process for identifying and
developing remedial action plans for impaired water bodies under CWA
section 303(d) (TMDLs). That is true particularly because states
arguably have a disincentive to list more impaired waters because of
both the additional workload it generates, and the stigma of having a
higher percentage of water body impairment.
To address this inherent uncertainty in narrative water quality criteria,
states also employ numeric criteria that establish precise, measurable,
and enforceable benchmarks of water quality. 245 The advantage of
numeric criteria is that they articulate a bright line for identifying water
body impairment and the resulting listing of waters in the TMDL
process. The disadvantages, however, cut in the direction of both
potential under- and over-inclusiveness. Numeric criteria alone might
under-identify impaired waters because they address the effects of only
one pollutant at time. They might over-identify impaired waters because
a moderate exceedance of a single numeric criterion might not cause any
real harm, depending on other factors.
To address the potential issue of under-inclusiveness, states also use
whole effluent toxicity (WET) criteria, which are methods to address the
cumulative and synergistic impacts of multiple pollutants in a water
body. 246 In theory, the WET process can be used to assess the toxicity of
discharges from individual facilities, 247 but also to measure toxicity in a
water body itself as a result of aggregate sources of pollution. 248 Because

26 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK], available at
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/handbook/index.cfm.
245. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(b)(1); WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 244, at
3-24. In the 1987 CWA amendments, Congress required states to adopt numeric water quality
criteria for all toxic pollutants that could “reasonably be expected to interfere with” designated uses
in the state. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 308(d), 101 Stat. 7, 39 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(B)).
246. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 189–91 (D.C. Cir. 1988); WATER
QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 244, at 3-26.
247. See Natural Res. Def. Council, 859 F.2d 156; Adler, supra note 240, at 350–51, 356–58
(discussing use of whole effluent toxicity for both individual permits and in assessing water body
conditions).
248. See Adler, supra note 240, at 354–55.
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conditions in a particular water body can change so frequently, however,
a WET sample can only measure a snapshot of water quality toxicity.
With the possible exception of WET criteria, these forms of water
quality criteria are inherently generic in nature, and are developed first
by EPA on a national scale pursuant to CWA section 304(a). 249 By rule,
EPA encourages states to adopt those criteria or to modify those criteria
to suit their own conditions, but typically on a statewide basis. 250
Therefore, they do not establish water body-specific goals and
requirements. Second, none of those forms of water quality criteria, even
when taken together, address the full aspiration of the CWA to restore
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters.
That requires a more holistic assessment of overall aquatic ecosystem
health. 251
To address this gap in our ability to measure attainment of the CWA’s
overriding goal in a more functional and comprehensive manner, aquatic
ecologists began to develop biocriteria beginning in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. 252 Biocriteria use protocols designed to assess the relative
structural and functional integrity of an aquatic ecosystem by
statistically characterizing the degree of difference between the system
being assessed and the characteristics of a relatively unimpaired system,
known as reference water body. 253 An increasing number of states,
interstate water quality agencies, and tribes are using biocriteria to better
define and determine whether the aspirations of the CWA are being
met. 254 EPA explained in summary how biological methods can be used
249. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a); see also WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 244,
app. I (listing EPA’s Water Quality Criteria Documents for various pollutants).
250. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(b) (authorizing states to adopt EPA’s recommended water quality
criteria or to adopt more specific criteria where justified scientifically).
251. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 717 (1994)
(noting that “water quality requirements generally sufficient to protect designated uses” cannot
always measure water body impairment in specific water bodies).
252. See James R. Karr, Assessment of Biotic Integrity Using Fish Communities, FISHERIES,
Nov.–Dec. 1981, at 21; James R. Karr & Daniel R. Dudley, Ecological Perspective on Water
Quality Goals, 5 ENVTL. MGMT. 55 (1981). For an early history of biocriteria development, see
Wayne S. Davis, Biological Assessment and Criteria: Building on the Past, in BIOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENT AND CRITERIA, TOOLS FOR WATER RESOURCE PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING,
supra note 240, at 15.
253. More precisely, biocriteria “are numeric values or narrative expressions that describe the
reference biological integrity of aquatic communities inhabiting waters that have been given a
designated aquatic life use.” EPA, EPA-440/5-91-003, BIOLOGICAL CRITERIA: STATE
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS, at v (1991).
254. See EPA, EPA-822-F-03-005, STATES AND TRIBES EMBRACE BIOASSESSMENT AND
BIOCRITERIA FOR PROTECTING STREAMS AND SMALL RIVERS (2003); EPA, SUMMARY OF
BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAMS AND BIOCRITERIA DEVELOPMENT FOR STATES, TRIBES,
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to assess the biological integrity of aquatic ecosystems:
Biological assessments can be used to directly measure the
overall biological integrity of an aquatic community and the
synergistic effects of stressors on the aquatic biota residing in a
waterbody where there are well-developed biological assessment
programs . . . . This increases the likelihood of detecting the
effects of episodic events (e.g., spills, dumping, treatment plant
malfunctions), toxic nonpoint source (NPS) pollution (e.g.
agricultural pesticides), cumulative pollution (i.e., multiple
impacts over time or continuous low-level stress), nontoxic
mechanisms of impact (e.g. trophic structure changes due to
nutrient enrichment), or other impacts that periodic sampling
might not detect. 255
Biocriteria thus serve as more precise and more holistic benchmarks
for aquatic ecosystem health because they assess the degree to which
those systems have the ecological structure and functions that
characterize biological integrity. Unlike other forms of water quality
criteria, which describe what is bad, or those characteristics of water
bodies we want to avoid, they describe more precisely and scientifically
the characteristics of ecosystem health we aspire to achieve.
2.

Hydro-Geomorphic Method of Wetland Assessment

The second example of a more aspirational approach to assessing
aquatic ecosystem health that embodies a very similar idea is the
“hydrogeomorphic method” (HGM) of wetlands assessment. 256 The
HGM does the same thing for real-world wetlands functions and values
as biocriteria do for rivers and other flowing water bodies, by comparing
the values and functions provided by reference wetlands of the same or
similar types to those in a wetland sought to be protected or restored. 257
The HGM process addresses common problems with implementation
of the CWA section 404 permitting program. When the U.S. Army

TERRITORIES, AND INTERSTATE COMMISSIONS: STREAMS AND WADEABLE RIVERS 1–2 (2002).
255. EPA, A PRIMER ON USING BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS TO SUPPORT WATER QUALITY
MANAGEMENT 1 (2011).
256. See The National Action Plan to Implement the Hydrogeomorphic Approach to Assessing
Wetland Functions, 62 Fed. Reg. 33,607 (June 20, 1997); MARK M. BRINSON, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENG’RS, A HYDROGEOMORPHIC CLASSIFICATION FOR WETLANDS (1993); R. DANIEL SMITH ET AL.,
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, AN APPROACH FOR ASSESSING WETLAND FUNCTIONS USING
HYDROGEOMORPHIC CLASSIFICATION, REFERENCE WETLANDS, AND FUNCTIONAL INDICES (1995).
257. See The National Action Plan to Implement the Hydrogeomorphic Approach to Assessing
Wetland Functions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 33,609.
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Corps of Engineers grants a permit to fill wetlands, in theory the
developer must provide compensatory mitigation to more than offset the
harm by restoring or enhancing degraded wetlands elsewhere, or by
creating artificial wetlands. 258 Absent that requirement, permits issued
under section 404 allowing dischargers to fill entire water bodies—as
distinct to section 402 permits allowing more limited pollutant
releases—could not possibly meet the ultimate statutory goal.
For much of the history of the section 404 program, however,
compensatory mitigation has been demonstrably inadequate to replace
the lost ecological, hydrological, and other values and functions once
provided by filled wetlands. 259 Until recently, the Corps has measured
the sufficiency of compensatory mitigation through the simple calculus
of counting acres. Permits allowed destruction of X acres of natural
wetlands in return for compensatory mitigation on Y acres of restored or
created ones, and so long as Y is greater than X, the permit was
approved. Little effort was even taken to confirm that the compensatory
mitigation had successfully been achieved after the initial fill was
allowed, by which time it is too late to recover the lost benefits from the
filled wetland.
Compensatory mitigation policy has improved, at least in concept,
under revised regulations adopted by EPA and the Corps of Engineers in
response to additional Congressional direction. 260 Wetland mitigation
arguably has improved as well through the use of wetland mitigation
banks in which mitigation credits cannot be made available for new
permits until creation or restoration of wetland values and functions is
successfully demonstrated. 261
Successful implementation of a compensatory mitigation program, for
wetlands or any other ecosystem, requires the ability to answer the
fundamental question of “what was really lost and what was really
gained in return?” How much wildlife habitat was lost, and of what
type? How much nutrient-filtering capacity was lost? How much floodretention potential was lost?
The HGM is designed to measure those real-world wetlands values
and functions through a process quite similar to that used in establishing
biocriteria. Because there are so many different types of wetlands, and
258. See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text (describing compensatory mitigation
requirements for section 404 permits); 40 C.F.R. pt. 230, subpt. J (2012).
259. See COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES, supra note 195, at 113–22.
260. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
261. See Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking, and
Takings, 81 IOWA L. REV. 527 (1996).
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because wetlands vary significantly in the specific values and functions
they provide, 262 ensuring compensatory mitigation cannot be as simple
as counting acres. A diverse natural mosaic of wetland habitat will
provide far more biodiversity benefits than a similar amount of
homogenous, artificially created wetlands. A relatively narrow linear
system of riparian wetlands provides more flood-control benefits than a
single large pond. To account for those variables, the HGM classifies
wetlands by type, and delineates and quantifies the values and functions
they each provide. This process thereby generates a system of metrics
through which the values and functions provided by restored or created
wetlands can be measured and compared to the values and functions lost
through the permitted fill. 263
Like biocriteria, therefore, the HGM provides a more water bodyspecific method of analyzing whether the fundamental aspirations of the
CWA are achieved in the section 404 program. However, as with
biocriteria, analysis suggests that HGM is not being adopted rapidly in
the field, 264 and that the process does not measure all wetland values and
functions adequately absent more intensive data. 265 As such, HGM may
still have untapped potential in improving the extent to which wetland
values and functions are protected or restored under the section 404
program.
3.

Desired Future Conditions for Watersheds

The third example of metrics designed to define more precisely the
CWA aspirations with respect to individual water bodies is a little more
vague and variable, and comes from the world of watershed restoration
and management. Although the watershed restoration and management
concept itself is inherently diverse and has been received with varying

262. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 256, at 11.
263. See The National Action Plan to Implement the Hydrogeomorphic Approach to Assessing
Wetland Functions, 62 Fed. Reg. 33,607, 33,609–10 (June 20, 1997); SMITH ET AL., supra note 256,
at 1–5.
264. See Charles Andrew Cole & James G. Kooser, HGM: Hidden, Gone, Missing?, WETLAND
SCI. & PRAC., June 2003, at 9; Jon Kusler, Recommendations for Reconciling Wetland Assessment
OF
STATE
WETLAND
MANAGERS
(Apr.
2006),
Techniques,
ASSOCIATION
http://www.aswm.org/pdf_lib/reconciling.pdf (finding problems with HGM implementation).
265. See Thomas Hruby, Testing the Basic Assumption of the Hydrogeomorphic Approach to
Assessing Wetland Functions, 27 ENVTL. MGMT. 749 (2001) (questioning assumption that modified
wetlands provide fewer values and functions than unimpaired wetlands); Emilie K. Stander & Joan
G. Ehrenfeld, Rapid Assessment of Urban Wetlands: Do Hydrogeomorphic Classification and
Reference Criteria Work?, 43 ENVTL. MGMT. 725 (2009) (finding problems with HGM assessment
of nitrogen cycling).
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levels of favor, 266 one common characteristic of watershed management
is a collaborative effort to identify the “desired future conditions” of a
water body. 267 A desired future condition, of course, can be just as vague
as “no toxics in toxic amounts.” When applied most effectively,
however, a statement of desired future conditions identifies watershed
restoration and protection goals much more precisely, and in a manner
appropriate to the particular system at issue.
Although the Chesapeake Bay Program has had significant
implementation and attainment issues in its long history, 268 it is a good
example of a collaborative effort to establish specific, measurable
watershed restoration targets. Rather than simply defining regulatory
standards of conduct or pollution reduction targets, the program defines
more functional ecosystem restoration goals: 269 How many acres of
submerged aquatic vegetation are necessary to support healthy
populations of waterfowl? What population of blue crabs is necessary
for a sustainable population and healthy economy? 270 Those measures
266. See Robert W. Adler & Michele Straube, Watersheds and the Integration of U.S. Water Law
and Policy: Bridging the Great Divides, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2000); Jon
Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 379 (2000); A. Dan Tarlock, Putting Rivers Back in the Landscape: The Revival of Watershed
Management in the United States, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1059 (2008);
Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in
Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239 (2008).
267. A “desired future condition” refers to the “social, economic, and ecological attributes”
expected from adoption of a particular resource management regime, and derives from federal
ecosystem management policy. See Robert E. Bennetts & Bruce B. Bingham, Comparing Current
and Desired Conditions of Resource Values for Evaluating Management Performance: A
Cautionary Note on an Otherwise Useful Concept, 24 GEORGE WRIGHT F. 108, 108 (2007).
268. See Robert W. Adler, Priceline for Pollution: Auctions to Allocate Public Pollution Control
Dollars, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 745, 796–807 (2010) (providing history and
status of Bay cleanup efforts); William L. Andreen et al., White Paper 11-02, Missing the Mark in
the Chesapeake Bay: A Report Card for the Phase I Watershed Implementation Plans, CENTER FOR
PROGRESSIVE
REFORM
(Jan.
2011),
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/
ChesBay_WIPs_1102.pdf; State of the Bay 2010, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION (2010),
http://www.cbf.org/document.doc?id=596 (reporting limited progress in overall Bay restoration
efforts and failing or near-failing grades in most aspects of the Bay’s water pollution control
programs).
269. See EPA, STRENGTHENING THE MANAGEMENT, COORDINATION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF
THE CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM: REPORT TO CONGRESS (2008); Carl Hershner et al., Assessment
of Chesapeake Bay Program Selection and Use of Indicators, 4 ECOHEALTH 187, 189 (2007).
270. These program goals and commitments are formally recognized in an agreement entitled
Chesapeake 2000, signed on June 28, 2000. Chesapeake 2000, CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM,
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/content/publications/cbp_12081.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2013).
Specific goals in the agreement include a tenfold increase in native oysters in the Bay relative to a
1994 baseline; restoring fish passage for migratory to more than 1357 miles of blocked river habitat;
protecting and restoring 114,000 acres of submerged aquatic vegetation; restoring 25,000 acres of
wetlands; and reducing nutrient loadings by 40%. Id.
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are similar to the concept of minimum viable population size common in
ESA implementation, 271 and support the restoration component of the
CWA aspiration. More important, like both biocriteria and HGM, they
help to define and provide a more specific set of criteria by which to
ascertain whether the CWA aspirations are being achieved.
B.

Moving from Aspiration to Attainment

Articulating more specific goals for individual water bodies has two
important conceptual advantages. First, it is often easier to achieve
specific, clearly defined goals than a lofty but vague concept such as
“physical, chemical, and biological integrity.” Second, principles of
bioregionalism suggest that individuals and communities are more
willing to accept costs—including both economic costs and volunteer
work—designed to restore and maintain special local or regional places
than to implement generic programs with a huge national price tag and
less clearly defined benefits to local communities.272 The three examples
discussed above illustrate this kind of effort and how it can operate
within, rather than replace, the existing construct of the CWA. These
programs all require more time and effort to more precisely define what
the generic aspirations in the CWA actually mean for individual water
bodies and watersheds, but have the potential to cost-effectively improve
the degree to which those aspirations are actually attained.
Defining CWA aspirations more precisely for individual water
bodies, however, absent implementing actions in the real world, does not
ensure that those aspirations will be attained. So why might these ideas
be helpful in renewing the spirit of aspiration in the CWA? I am not
suggesting that these methodologies, individually or collectively,
constitute the “silver bullet” that will generate full attainment of the
CWA aspirations absent other reforms. There are at least three reasons to
believe, however, that re-defining aspirations in this way can at least
generate some progress toward than end.
First, particularly given the increasingly prevalent anti-regulatory
sentiment in the United States, perhaps fueled in part by the “societal

271. See Notice of Availability of Recovery Goals for Four Endangered Fishes of the Colorado
River Basin, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,270 (Aug. 28, 2002); Mark Shaffer, Minimum Viable Population
Goals: Coping with Uncertainty, in VIABLE POPULATIONS FOR CONSERVATION 69 (Michael E.
Soulé ed., 1987).
272. See Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973,
1000–03 (1994) (describing place-based incentives for watershed protection). See generally
BIOREGIONALISM (Michael McGinnis ed., 1998).
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amnesia” discussed earlier, 273 it is possible that the individuals and
organizations responsible for CWA implementation will respond better
to affirmative goals than to prohibitions. Each of the ecosystem
restoration and protection measures described above is stated in
affirmative rather than negative terms. The first time I wrote about
biocriteria in a book chapter published 1995, I described them in this
regard as “aims to achieve, not ills to avoid.” 274
As explained earlier, the CWA is an aspirational statute, but most of
the actual implementation mechanisms are “ills to avoid” rather than
“aims to achieve.” Section 301(a) prohibits any discharge of a pollutant
absent a permit that implements various substantive requirements.275 No
such permit may be issued absent the imposition of effluent limitations
governing the allowable discharges. 276 Any violation of those permit
limitations can generate administrative, civil, or criminal penalties. 277 As
a result, there is a significant disconnect between the aspirational goals
and the prohibitive implementation tools.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that we abandon any of those
essential regulatory or enforcement tools for the most fundamental
operative requirements of the CWA. If we did, we would almost
certainly backslide from the past progress we have made in CWA
implementation to date. Perhaps the chief lesson from the past forty
years, however, is that to move beyond that existing progress we need to
inspire people that there are affirmative aims to achieve. With the hope
that this does not seem like a trivial analogy, my strong impression is
that there is far less littering today than when I grew up, and certainly
less than in many parts of world. Did we succeed in reducing littering by
imposing hefty fines, or because of the “Keep America Beautiful”
campaign 278 that captured public imagination?
A second and related reason why the above means of redefining the
aspirations in the CWA might also help to promote better attainment is
that people and communities respond better when they have a role in
defining the aims to achieve. That is particularly true for place-based
watershed programs that assemble diverse group of community
participants to define the “desired future conditions” of the watershed. In
273. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
274. Adler, supra note 240, at 346.
275. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006) (prohibiting any discharge absent compliance with §§ 302, 306,
and 307, and pursuant to permits issued under either § 402 or § 404).
276. Id. §§ 1311(b), 1342.
277. Id. § 1319.
278. KEEP AMERICA BEAUTIFUL, http://www.kab.org (last visited Aug. 11, 2013).
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rural watersheds, maybe farmers will be more willing to achieve an
affirmative result than to stop doing something because EPA said so. In
urban watersheds, maybe individuals will be more willing to volunteer
in local stream restoration projects if they understand exactly what flood
control, aesthetic, and ecosystem benefits they will enjoy, and once they
support those efforts will be less opposed to increased sewerage and
storm water collection and treatment fees to protect their personal
investments in the health of their local waterways.
Third, perhaps by more clearly defining the aims to achieve in CWA
implementation, we can transcend the philosophy of “we have done the
best we can,” which is fairly pervasive in the “best technology” aspects
of the CWA. 279 Although best-technology principles arguably are
responsible for much of the progress we have made in achieving the
CWA’s aspirations, the converse argument is that once we have done the
best we can, what else is there? Perhaps more specific, affirmative
statements of water body-specific aspirations will induce more
innovation than is traditionally inherent in best technology requirements,
which some scholars have argued actually provide a disincentive for
innovation because once developed, they must be adopted across the
board. 280
CONCLUSION
Four decades after Congress set forth ambitious aspirations for the
nation’s waters, we have made significant progress in some aspects of
water pollution control, but far less in others. More important, progress
seems to have peaked a decade or two after statutory enactment and then
reached a plateau in many respects. This Article explored possible
reasons for that stagnation, and potential new strategies to try to
reinvigorate the statutory aspirations. If we renew our attention to the
fundamental aspirations of the CWA and try to define what they mean
more precisely and more pragmatically, they may help us to do what is
required.

279. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 173. My point here is not to take sides in this longstanding debate, although
historically I have advocated continued and improved implementation of best technology principles,
and even expanding them to nonpoint source pollution control efforts. See Robert W. Adler, Water
Quality and Agriculture: Assessing Alternative Futures, 25 ENVIRONS 77 (2002).

